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On May 24, 1972, United States District Judge Earl R. Larson
held the Minneapolis school district in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution in Booker v. Special School District
No. 1.1 When Judge Larson rendered his decision, it was undis-
puted that the Minneapolis public schools were segregated by race.2
Three of the district's elementary schools - Hay, Bethune and Wil-
lard - had minority enrollments exceeding seventy percent, at a
time when less than ten percent of the district's students were
black.3 Judge Larson found that the school district's actions had
increased and fostered racial segregation.4 He enjoined the district
from further racial discrimination and ordered the district to take
* B.S. 1978, University of Minnesota, J.D. cum laude 1981, University of Min-
nesota. Ms. Heilman is currently an Assistant Attorney General with the Office of
the Attorney General for the State of Minnesota. She was a law clerk for Judge Earl
R. Larson from 1981-1982 and again on a part-time basis from 1985-1991.
The author extends her thanks to Judge Larson, who graciously agreed to
share the newspaper file which his secretary of many years, Lucille M. Johnson, had
kept on the school desegregation case. These articles, along with the official files of
the case, which were obtained with the assistance of the clerk's office for the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota, form the basis for much of this
article. The author also wishes to thank Constance Huser, Professor Carol Chomsky
and Ann Huntrods for their efforts in reviewing and providing comments on draft
versions of the article. Finally, the author thanks her husband, James Widder, and
her children, Sarah and James, for their support and encouragement.
1. 351 F. Supp. 799, 809 (D. Minn. 1972).
2. Id. at 802.
3. Id. This article initially refers solely to black and white students, instead of
to all students of color, because when the school desegregation litigation began, the
focus was primarily on integrating white and black students. See infra notes 89 and
212-215 and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 809. "As a matter of law, the intended and inevitable effect of a series
of policy decisions made by the defendant Special School District #1, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, with respect to size and location of schools, transfer policies, and teacher
assignments as described in the Findings of Fact set out above has been to aggravate
and increase the racial segregation in its schools." Id.
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affirmative action to eliminate the effects of its prior
discrimination.5
The Booker decision had an enormous impact on the students,
teachers, administrators and parents involved in the Minneapolis
public schools. Like most school desegregation cases, the Booker
litigation was highly controversial. The court-imposed remedy,
which included the use of school buses to transport children, was
opposed by many parents and became an issue in school board elec-
tions. While the case was pending, Judge Larson received harass-
ing calls, abusive letters and even several threats on his life.6
Others, such as Minneapolis school board member Harry Davis, re-
mained steadfast advocates for judicial oversight of the desegrega-
tion process.7 Many supporters of the desegregation process,
including members of the black community, were disappointed by
the district's repeated failure to achieve compliance with the court's
desegregation orders. In 1978, Julia Cherry, the President of the
local NAACP, urged the court to retain jurisdiction over the case,
stating, "I know there are a lot of good people in Minneapolis....
[b]ut sometimes there has to be some pressure brought to bear to
bring that good out in people. I think this suit is it."s
This article chronicles the history - and the controversy -
surrounding the Booker litigation. Beginning with the reasons why
the plaintiffs in Booker decided to file suit, this article describes the
court proceedings, news accounts and information on the desegre-
gation process gathered by an advisory committee to the United
States Civil Rights Commission.9 The article concludes with Judge
Larson's decision to relinquish jurisdiction, after eleven years of
5. Id. at 809-11.
6. In 1983, Judge Larson consented to a rare interview with reporter Greg Pin-
ney, who covered the school desegregation case for the Minneapolis Tribune newspa-
per. Although Judge Larson said he had no hesitation finding the district guilty of
segregation, he acknowledged that his decisions in the case were not always popular.
E.g., Greg Pinney, Constitutional Rights Came Before 'White Flight' Concerns for
Judge, MuNnAPoL s TmB., July 18, 1983, at 1A, 5A; Bob Lundegaard, Judge Larson:
Quiet Man Amid Controversy, MINEAPoLus TRB., June 15, 1972, at 1A.
7. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
8. Transcript of Hearing at 314, Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-
71 Civ. 382 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 1978) (hereinafter 1978 Transcript).
9. The advisory committee hearings were part of a ten month study of desegre-
gation throughout the country. For three days in April 1976, the advisory committee
heard statements from individuals involved in the desegregation process in Minne-
apolis. A transcript of the statements made to the advisory committee is on file with
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in Washington D.C. (hereinafter Advisory
Comm. Tr.). Civil Rights Commission staff later reviewed the information gathered
by the advisory committee and issued a report in May, 1977. See Staff Report, U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, "School Desegregation in Minneapolis, Minnesota"
(May 1977) (hereinafter Staff Report).
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monitoring the school district's efforts, to allow the district the op-
portunity for autonomous compliance with constitutional
standards.1O
Understanding the history of the desegregation process in
Minneapolis provides an important background for evaluating new
developments in school integration/desegregation and lends per-
spective to the choices now confronting educators. This article at-
tempts to recount at least part of that history and the significant
role played by the federal court, and, in particular, by Judge Earl R.
Larson.
I. Pre-Litigation History
Discrimination was a fact of life in the Minneapolis school dis-
trict and the city at large in the decades preceding the Booker liti-
gation. A pattern of racially segregated schools existed in the city
since at least 1954,11 the year the Supreme Court declared segrega-
tion unlawful in Brown v. Board of Education.12 This educational
segregation resulted both because of residential segregation' 3 and
because of specific school board policies relating to the size and loca-
tion of schools, attendance zones, enrollment and transfer policies
and teacher assignments. x4
A. Discrimination in the 1950s and 1960s
At trial, Judge Larson heard compelling evidence of the dis-
trict's discriminatory practices in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1964, for
example, the district added seven new classrooms to Field Elemen-
tary School in order to maintain Field as "the identifiably 'Black
school' in south central Minneapolis," while keeping the schools ad-
10. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 5 (D.
Minn. June 8, 1983).
11. Booker v. Special School District No.1,351 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D. Minn. 1972).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Racial discrimination in housing was legal until passage of the Federal Fair
Housing Act in 1968. The city's neighborhoods were segregated, in large part be-
cause of intentional housing discrimination. Black teachers testified at the Booker
trial about apartment managers who told them "we don't rent to blacks," and about
real estate agents who maintained separate books for homes in the "Negro neighbor-
hood." Trial Transcript, Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382,
93-94, 150-52 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 1972) (hereinafter 1972 Transcript). In addition,
low income housing, which was substantially occupied by black and other minority
persons, was limited to near-north and near-south Minneapolis until 1969. Id. at
328-30. See also Booker, 351 F. Supp. at 806 ("[plrior to 1962 it was common prac-
tice for members of the Board of Realtors to only show minority persons houses in
certain areas").
14. Booker, 351 F. Supp. at 803-06.
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jacent to Field 100% white.15 The next year, the district added an-
other portable classroom at Field, even though two of the nearby
"white" schools - Hale and Northrup - were underenrolled.16
The court's findings detailed other discriminatory patterns in
the construction of schools for all white neighborhoods, while main-
taining older, larger schools in the black neighborhoods.17 The dis-
trict changed boundary lines, granted "special transfers" at the
request of parents, and created "optional attendance zones" to allow
white students to "escape" from schools with minority enrollments
to identifiably white schools.18
The district also discriminated in the hiring and assignment of
teachers. Employment application forms for black teachers rou-
tinely contained comments such as "a fine physical specimen," "[b]ig
fat colored woman with seven kids," "[a] dark complexioned colored
boy with a red vest," and "[w]e can find better colored candidates."19
Comments such as these continued to appear on prospective teach-
ers' applications until the early 1960s, when federal authorities in-
tervened and ordered the practice stopped.20
The experiences of individual teachers reflected similar dis-
criminatory actions by the district. When Dr. Joyce Jackson began
her teaching career in 1952, she was the only black teacher in a
predominately white south-central Minneapolis school.21 Like
other black teachers hired by the district in the 1950s, she was of-
fered a position in special education, although this was not her area
of expertise. After she was hired, every black student in the school
was assigned to Jackson's classroom for the educable mentally
retarded.22
Earl Bowman, a black graduate of Macalester College in St.
Paul, was also hired by the district in the 1950s.23 Although princi-
pals and administrators gave Bowman high marks, they recom-
mended "selective school placement," meaning schools in which
there were mixed racial groups. 24 Bowman was offered and ac-
15. Id. at 808. Forty percent of the students who attended Field in 1964 were
minority students. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 803-04. "The pattern that emerges is that in areas where there were
small White neighborhoods adjacent to large minority neighborhoods, abnormally
small White elementary schools were constructed, while at the same time large
Black elementary schools were maintained." Id.
18. Id. at 804.
19. 1972 Transcript, supra note 13, at 184-86.
20. Id. at 184.
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id. at 25.
23. Id. at 135-36.
24. Id. at 138.
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cepted a position at Central High, a south-central school with a sig-
nificant minority enrollment. Bowman was named "co-coach" at
Central High because Minneapolis reportedly was not "ready for a
Negro coach" in the 1950s. 25
The late 1960s brought changes to the city of Minneapolis and
its schools. There were riots in the black community in 1966, and
disturbances at some of the district's schools. 26 A group of con-
cerned citizens - both black and white - formed the Committee
for Integrated Education ("CIE").27 The committee's goal was to
convince the school board and school administrators that desegre-
gation was essential for Minneapolis schools.28
In 1966 the district closed Warrington School, which had a
98% black enrollment.29 School Superintendent Putnam took early
retirement in 1967 and was replaced by Dr. John Davis, who ap-
peared more receptive than Putnam to desegregation efforts. The
district also published its first Human Relations Guidelines in
1967, which were designed to begin the desegregation process.3O
Under the Guidelines, students had the opportunity to participate
in a voluntary urban transfer program. The Minneapolis school
board also gained its first black member, Harry Davis, who served
throughout the course of the Booker litigation.31
B. The Decision to File Suit
These developments did not, however, significantly change
either the extent of segregation in Minneapolis schools or the atti-
tudes of many parents whose children attended those schools.
Moreover, from the perspective of those who would later bring legal
action against the district, the school board continued to act in the
late 1960s in ways that promoted segregation. As the attorney for
the plaintiff schoolchildren, Charles Quaintance, noted:
We [knew] that in 1967, that the Board had adopted human
relations guidelines under which they committed themselves to
a planning of new schools ... in such a way as to [provide for
desegregation], . . . but we were aware that in December of
1967, the district had decided where it was going to locate the
Bethune [Elementary] School and decided it was going to have
25. Id. at 138-40.
26. Id. at 152, 1076.
27. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 29.
28. Id. at 29, 38.
29. Id. at 18.
30. Id. at 18-19, 308-09.
31. Id. at 308.
19931
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an unusually large school and that it was going to be opened in
such a way as to be racially identifiable. 3 2
As Judge Larson's findings later indicated, the district over-
sized Bethune Elementary School with the knowledge that most of
the children from the predominately black near north side of the
city would go to Bethune rather than "spilling over into neighboring
schools with larger majority enrollments."33 The driving force be-
hind the district's decisions regarding school size and attendance
boundaries was "public pressure not to integrate."34
Public pressure against integration surfaced often during the
period immediately prior to the plaintiffs' decision to file suit. Op-
ponents of desegregation were vocal during the numerous meetings
held by the school district in 1969 as part of the process of revising
the 1967 Human Relations Guidelines.35 The school board adopted
revised guidelines in 1970. However, the vocal opposition of deseg-
regation opponents left parents active in CIE unconvinced that the
school board would take any decisive action to desegregate. 36 CIE
member Barbara Schwartz explained why CIE came to believe that
court action was necessary to achieve desegregation: "After writing
two Guidelines... this Guideline writing then became a substitute
for action.... It seemed as if intentions were good, but somehow we
just couldn't take that step beyond good intentions. I guess we felt
it just had to be forced."3 7
During the summer of 1970, parents who participated in CIE
and in the local NAACP approached attorney Charles Quaintance
for advice on how to force the school district to commit to a timeta-
ble or plan for integration. Quaintance, then an attorney with the
Maslon law firm, had extensive personal and professional experi-
ence with desegregation cases. He participated in several civil
rights and school desegregation lawsuits as a member of the Civil
Rights Division of the United States Justice Department prior to
coming to Minneapolis in 1970.38 Understanding that the case
would be a pro bono effort, Quaintance agreed to attend a meeting
sponsored by the school district to find out more about the district's
32. Id. at 433-44.
33. Booker v. Special School District No.1, 351 F. Supp. 799,803 (D. Minn. 1972).
34. Id. at 806.
35. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 204.
36. Id. at 31.
37. Id. at 33-34.
38. This brief biographical information is taken from a recent article about
Quaintance which appeared in the newsletter of his church, Plymouth Congrega-
tional Church. See Theresa Voss-Williams, Chad and Lucy Quaintance, Walking the
Slow, Steady Path to Change, Flame, July 1992, at 4-5 (Plymouth Congregational
Church, Plymouth, MN) (on file with the Law & Inequality Journal).
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desegregation plans. Quaintance recalled that meeting in his state-
ment before the advisory committee to the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission:
The district was at that time conducting a - as I recall, a pub-
lic relations or public educational campaign, and I went to one
of those meetings.... and I recall asking the associate superin-
tendent ... when the district intended to implement whatever
plans it had adopted, and his response was that, well, they
hadn't decided on that, that it could be in 1975 - it could be
1980, and it could be 1985; and the district just hadn't made
that decision yet, and in effect, that it would depend in part on
the response of the community. 39
Quaintance agreed that a lawsuit was warranted because, in
his view,
the response of the community would essentially preclude the
adoption of an effective integration plan so long as the district
tied public acceptance to the adoption; in other words, as long
as the district acted on the premise that it only could go as far
as the majority of the people wanted it to go, or would permit it
to go, politically - it just wouldn't ever implement a plan.40
Quaintance was also convinced that faculty integration also "would
not occur voluntarily in this school district."41 In the fall of 1970,
Quaintance agreed to represent those who sought integration if two
things occurred:
[O]ne, if we could conduct an investigation that would show we
could prove segregation in the district in such a way that we
would be likely to win the case; and second, if it could be
demonstrated that there was adequate public support - not
meaning that there was support by the majority of the people,
but.., substantial public sentiment for doing it.42
As the plaintiffs explored the possibilities of commencing a
lawsuit, opponents of desegregation became more vocal in response
to the school board's proposal in November, 1970, to "pair" several
schools for desegregation purposes.4 3 The pairing process involved
combining the attendance areas of two adjacent K-6 elementary
schools. Instead of two K-6 schools, one school would serve all K-3
students in the expanded attendance area; the other school would
serve all students in grades 4-6.44 Such "pairing" would keep
neighborhoods together for school attendance purposes and would
39. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 429.
40. Id. at 430.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 430-31.
43. Id. at 536-37.
44. Id. at 540. See also Gregor W. Pinney, Innovative Education Planned for
Field, Hale, MINEmAOLs Tars., Aug. 30, 1971, at 4A_
1993]
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ensure that children would attend their "neighborhood" school for
at least part of their elementary years.
Two of the schools chosen by the school board for pairing were
Hale Elementary School, which was then 98% white, and Field Ele-
mentary School, which was then 54% black.45 According to Hale
Principal Gladys Anderson Johnson, "[t]here was considerable com-
munity resistance" to the pairing proposal, 46 resistance which
Judge Larson described as "vehement."47 In response to the public
outcry, the school board immediately announced that the plan was
not definite and that there would be an opportunity for further
discussion.
By early winter of 1971, attorney Quaintance had "in effect
advised the district that [the plaintiffs] anticipated filing an ac-
tion."48 Later that spring, the State Commissioner of Education
cited seventeen of the district's schools for violating the state's
newly adopted desegregation guidelines.49 These guidelines set a
30% ceiling for minority student enrollment in public schools
throughout the state. Many of the seventeen schools cited in Min-
neapolis were substantially above the 30% ceiling.50
Both the state's action and the threat of litigation prompted
the school board to vote in April 1971 to proceed with the Hale-
Field pairing.5' Despite significant programmatic improvements
and other incentives for "test case" participants, the Hale-Field
pairing "polarized the city and became the major issue in.. . school
board elections."5 2 The two board members who won in the 1971
elections, Philip Olson and Marilyn Borea, "ran as avowed oppo-
nents of busing or forced integration in any other form. The two
45. Pinney, supra note 44, at 4A.
46. Id.
47. Booker v. Special School District No.1, 351 F. Supp. 799,806 (D. Minn. 1972).
48. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 432.
49. Id.
50. The Board of Education first proposed desegregation regulations in Novem-
ber 1969, but the negative reaction from the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul pro-
moted the Board to adopt the proposed regulations as guidelines instead. Id. at 114-
118.
51. A New York Times article described the choice of Hale and Field as "a cau-
tious move in itself... [the schools were] only a mile and a quarter apart... the
Hale district was large ... a third of the white youngsters had been bused before...
[and the two schools were] similar in size and physical condition." 2 Schools 'Paired'
By Minneapolis, N.Y. TuMEs, Sept. 19, 1971, at 66.
52. Id. Subsequently, teachers did transfer within the system and did receive
human relations training. Students and parents also participated in trips to schools
to familiarize them with their new schools. Innovative Education Planned for Field,
Hale, MINNEAPOLIs TRm., Aug. 30, 1971, at 1A.
[Vol. 12:127
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
candidates they defeated had endorsed the pairing plan."5 3 Olson
and Borea won the election with 60% of the vote.5 4
Shortly after the election, parents and guardians of children
within the Minneapolis school system who favored school integra-
tion filed suit against the school district on behalf of all Minneapolis
schoolchildren.55 The class action complaint alleged that the dis-
trict had denied the schoolchildren of Minneapolis equal educa-
tional opportunity by discriminating on the basis of race in the
operation of the Minneapolis public schools.56 The school district's
answer did not deny the history of segregation, but claimed that
court intervention was unwarranted and unnecessary.57 The dis-
trict asserted that it had taken significant steps toward eradicating
any discrimination that may have existed in the schools and at-
tached to its answer a plan which the school district had developed
to improve racial balance in the schools.5 8
This plan had not been formally adopted by the school board,
however, and as the Hale-Field pairing began to be implemented,
district administrators also began public hearings on proposals for
desegregating the district's schools.59 "School officials told the
audiences at the meetings that, by implementing its own desegre-
gation plan, the school system could avoid the loss of local control
that could come as a result of a plan ordered by the courts or forced
by action of the State Board [of Education]".60 In his statement
before the Civil Rights Commission advisory committee, Superin-
tendent Davis readily admitted that:
[W]ithout question, the threat of the court case and the reality
of the court case precipitated more and more attention to the
development of a plan. One of the statements we made in can-
dor was ... we would now like the right to use our own plan
53. 2 Schools 'Paired", supra note 51, at 66.
54. Id.
55. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Minn.
1972).
56. Id. at 801-02.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Jim Talle, Busing: Reaction at City Meetings Was Mixed, But Definite,
MInNmAPoLs STAR, Dec. 9, 1971, at LA. The three plans proposed for discussion
were all reportedly "somewhat similar in that all propose to create three 1,800-pupil
elementary school complexes to replace several of the city's oldest schools, and to bus
students and change boundaries enough to get the schools below the State Board of
Education guideline's maximum of 30% minority enrollment in any school." Id. at
2A
One of the plans also "included a proposed exchange with schools in suburban
Robbinsdale and Golden Valley." Gregor W. Pinney, Pairing, Large Schools Seen as
Davis Desegregation Plan, MNNEmoLs TRIB., Mar. 14, 1972, at 9A. However, those
districts refused to commit to the proposal. Id.
60. Talle, supra note 59, at 2A
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before we have imposed on us a federal court plan, so citizens,
faculty, staff and students - let's get together and put it to-
gether .... [b]efore the Federal Court "tells us what to do".61
Groups at some of the meetings held by the district appeared
about equally divided between supporters and opponents of the de-
segregation process. 62 At a meeting at Washburn High School in
south-central Minneapolis, Hale Principal Gladys Anderson offered
her view that the Hale-Field pairing had been "entirely successful
as far as the attitudes of the children are concerned."63 The 200
people at Henry High School in north Minneapolis, however, were
almost entirely opposed to any form of busing.64 Calls to repeat the
anti-pairing and anti-busing victories of the two candidates in the
last school board election were "frequent and well-received by the
audience" at Henry.65
H. The Court Becomes Involved: 1972
The first court order in the Booker case was issued in Febru-
ary, 1972. The order certified a class on behalf of all children who
were residents of the city of Minneapolis and who attended its pub-
lic schools.66 The order was signed by United States District Judge
Earl R. Larson, the Judge assigned to hear Booker. Judge Larson
grew up in north Minneapolis and graduated from North High
School prior to attending the University of Minnesota and the uni-
versity's law school.67 After law school, Larson worked in the U.S.
Attorney's Office, served during the war in U.S. Naval Intelligence,
and formed his own law firm prior to becoming a judge.68 Active in
community affairs while in private practice, Larson served as chair
of the Governor's Interracial Commission, a forerunner of the
Human Rights Commission, and helped found the Minnesota Civil
Liberties Union. Larson was appointed to the federal bench in 1961
by President Kennedy.6 9
Judge Larson scheduled the trial for Booker in early April,
1972. Shortly before the trial began, the school board considered
the district's proposal for desegregating its schools. The district's
61. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 421.
62. Talle, supra note 59, at 2A.
63. Id. at 1A, 2A-
64. Id. at 1A.
65. Id. at 1.
66. Booker v. Special School District No.1, No. 4-71-Civ. 382 (D. Minn. Feb. 10,
1972).
67. See Bob Lundegaard, Judge Larson: Quiet Man Amid Controversy, MnqNP-
ous Tars., June 15, 1972, at A, 4A




plan sought to improve racial balance through additional pairings
such as Hale-Field, through clustering the attendance areas of
three or more schools to create expanded-community school com-
plexes, and through the realignment of some school attendance
boundaries. 70 The schools most affected by the plan were those
with a high percentage of minority students and those schools in
the immediately adjoining areas. 71
The same evening as closing arguments in the trial, the school
board voted 5 to 2 to adopt the proposed desegregation plan.7 2 O-
son and Borea, the two school board members elected on an anti-
busing platform, were the two board members who voted against
the plan.73 Before the vote, Harry Davis, the lone black member on
the school board, proposed an amendment to speed up the desegre-
gation process. His motion died for lack of a second. Although
many of the onlookers who attended the meeting applauded after
the plan was approved, Superintendent Davis and school board
members recognized "that the public outside still largely opposes
[desegregation]."74
Much of the testimony presented in the Booker trial focused on
the district's proposed desegregation plan. Attorneys for both the
plaintiffs and the school district referred to the plan often during
their closing arguments. As counsel for the school district, attorney
Norman Newhall argued that court intervention was unwarranted
because the district was working on its own to desegregate the
schools. 75 Newhall argued further that if the court disagreed and
70. Gregor W. Pinney, Pairing, Large Schools Seen as Davis Desegregation Plan,
MNNErAOsoS TRtu., Mar. 14, 1972, at LA, 9A.
71. Id.
72. The previous week, the school board held the only citywide hearing for the
plan. Two-thirds of the 300 people who attended the citywide meeting opposed both
the desegregation plan and any large scale effort involving busing. Doug Stone, Ci-
tywide School-Integration Hearing Adds Little, MiNNFAsxLs Tam., Apr. 12, 1972, at
B2.
Reporters found mixed emotions - and some trepidation - about desegre-
gating the city's schools. A white boy from northeast Minneapolis told a reporter,
"[w]e're going to move to the sticks if those niggers move over here." Gregor W.
Pinney, Northeast-North Side Busing May Be Plan's Toughest Test, M-NEAPOLmS
Tsm., Apr. 12, 1972, at B1. A white woman who did not want her children "bused
across the river" said, "I have no prejudice against the colored people as long as they
stay in their place and we stay in ours." Id. at B1, B10. Many blacks who were
interviewed were "willing to go along with desegregation,' but others had doubts.
One black woman who worked in northeast Minneapolis was concerned about send-
ing her children to a northeast area school because "the prejudice is in the air
[there]. You can feel it.' Id.
73. Gregor W. Pinney, City School Desegregation Plan Approved, MINNEA'oLIS
Tam., Apr. 26, 1972, at 1A
74. Id.
75. 1972 Transcript, supra note 13, at 1135-39.
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found school officials responsible for the condition of segregation in
the schools, the plan prepared by the district should be the remedy
imposed.76
Plaintiffs agreed that the district's plan had many positive ele-
ments, but they opposed the district's phased approach. 77 Plain-
tiffs' attorney, Charles Quaintance, urged the court to adopt the
modifications to the plan offered by plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr.
Michael Stolee.78 Dr. Stolee advocated desegregated schools across
the district by the fall of 1972. School officials acknowledged that
an accelerated plan was feasible, but they argued that the phased
approach was more compatible with a planned $19 million con-
struction program. 79 Plaintiffs' counsel responded: "The issue isn't
whether the district is going to use old buildings for the next two
years; but whether it will use them for segregated or integrated stu-
dent bodies."8O
School officials also opposed Dr. Stolee's accelerated plan be-
cause they wanted time to prepare as they had for the Hale-Field
pairing.81 Officials were convinced that the teacher training and
the preparation of parents and students who participated in the
Hale-Field pairing were key elements in the program's apparent
success. 82 In an effort to rebut Dr. Stolee's testimony that other
districts had successfully desegregated their schools in a short pe-
riod of time, the district called an official to testify about San Fran-
cisco's experience with a plan implemented as quickly as Dr.
Stolee's proposal for Minneapolis.83 San Francisco's Director of De-
segregation and Integration testified that the desegregation process
went smoothly in San Francisco, when his school district had suffi-
cient opportunity to plan and prepare. When the process was accel-
erated by court order, however, San Francisco officials encountered
a substantial boycott of the schools by parents and a frustrated and
unprepared teaching staff.s4
Judge Larson issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on May 24, 1972.85 Prior to a recitation of the facts which led
him to conclude the school district had acted unconstitutionally,
76. Id. at 1143.




81. Id. at 1130.
82. Id.
83. Dr. Stolee testified that a number of school districts, including San Fran-
cisco's, had implemented desegregation within a very short time. Id. at 613.
84. Id. at 781-86.
85. Booker v. Special School District No.1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972).
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Judge Larson stated: "[this Court feels little need to philosophize
on the evils of racial segregation, other than to note its firm belief
that it is both a moral and a legal wrong."86 Rejecting as irrelevant
any reliance on sociological or psychological data to support his rul-
ing, Judge Larson stated:
[c]ivil rights are not premised on sociological data or moral plat-
itudes. Instead, they are rooted solely in that "living document"
which contains the very essence of American life - the Consti-
tution. That document, and it alone, must provide the answers
in this case. Neither sociologists' findings nor the clamor of
misguided extremists have any bearing on the rights of these
plaintiffs. The answer can only come from sober judicial reflec-
tion, free from the rhetoric of would-be demagogues and fright-
ened parents.8 7
After finding "[i]t is an uncontroverted fact that the schools of the
City of Minneapolis are segregated," Judge Larson wrote it was the
duty of the court:
to objectively examine the facts in an effort to determine if the
defendant [school district] has fulfilled its constitutional duty to
the plaintiffs, and if not, what more must be done. This is not
an effort to assess blame; it is an effort to vindicate plaintiffs'
rights. The blame for segregation rests firmly on the shoulders
of p.11 of us.88
When the court's decision was rendered, 9.7% of the students
in the Minneapolis public schools were black, 3.5% were Native
American, and 85.5% were white.89 A majority of black students
attended schools which were over 30% minority. Three elementary
schools - Hay, Bethune, and Willard - had minority enrollments
exceeding 70%.90 After carefully reviewing the additional evidence
presented to him concerning the location of schools and student and
teacher assignments, Judge Larson concluded that the intentional
actions of the school district were in part responsible for the condi-
tion of segregation which existed in the Minneapolis public schools
in 1972.91
The judge accepted the district's plan as the basis for an ap-
propriate remedy and ordered the district to implement this plan.
However, because Judge Larson found no sound educational reason
to delay faculty desegregation, 92 his order accelerated the timetable
86. Id. at 803.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 802. In the 1971-72 school year, 65,201 students were enrolled in Min-
neapolis schools. "Of these, 55,735 were Caucasian, 6,351 were Black, 2,225 were
American Indian, and 890 were of other minority or ethnic backgrounds." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 809.
92. Id. at 810.
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for full compliance with the plan for faculties and administrators.
The court also reduced the maximum allowable percentage of mi-
nority students in any school from 40%, as proposed in the district's
plan, to 35%.93 Judge Larson retained jurisdiction to monitor com-
pliance and required the district to submit semi-annual reports de-
tailing the district's implementation efforts.94
As newspaper articles and editorials made clear, the Court's
ruling was based on the school district's intentional and deliberate
acts of segregation.95 Stating that "any objective review would find
it hard to come to another conclusion," editorial writers for the Min-
neapolis Tribune characterized Judge Larson's ruling as "a middle-
of-the-road approach."96 The newspaper urged residents to heed
the advice of School Board Chair Richard Allen, who said he hoped
the decision would be accepted "as a matter of law and the
Constitution."97
M. Implementing the District's Desegregation Plan:
1973-1976
When school began in the fall of 1972, the district had satis-
fied the faculty assignment portion of the court's order, largely
through the successful recruitment of additional minority teach-
ers.98 The first significant phase of the plan for students, though,
began in the fall of 1973.99
93. Id. at 810. "This is not to say that the Constitution requires a fixed racial
balance in public schools. The Court only uses the figure as a useful starting point in
shaping a remedy [for] ... past constitutional violations." Id.
94. Id.
95. Desegregating Minneapolis Schools, M-NEAPOLis TRm., May 26, 1972, at
14A ("Board of Education policies in past years overtly contributed to racial segrega-
tion in the schools").
96. Id.
97. Id. School board members Olson and Borea and Mayor Charles Stenvig ob-
jected to the court's decision to assume jurisdiction over the desegregation process,
but the district chose not to appeal Judge Larson's ruling. See id.; Bob Lundegaard,
supra note 67 at 1A.
98. After the district filed its first semi-annual report in December, 1972, plain-
tiffs moved for supplemental relief. The court granted plaintiffs' motion with regard
to faculty assignments by imposing a maximum as well as a minimum percentage of
minority faculty at each secondary school in order to implement the mandate that
"the faculties of the secondary schools shall be integrated so that each has approxi-
mately the same proportion of minority to majority teachers as there are minority to
majority teachers in the whole system." Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No.
4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. May 8, 1973).
99. A few secondary school boundary changes went into effect in the fall of 1972,
but these changes affected only a small number of students. Gregor W. Pinney,




Nine of the city's fifteen junior high schools were involved in
the transfer of 1,645 students in an effort to achieve the 35% minor-
ity population ceiling imposed by Judge Larson's order.OO The
largest program involved Bryant, Anthony and Ramsey Junior
High Schools, all in the south-west area of the city. One teacher
described the three schools prior to implementation of the desegre-
gation plan as follows: "Bryant was the low economic, high minor-
ity population kind of school.... Ramsey had quite a bit more class,
and was closer to the suburbs, had a very small ethnic minority
population; and Anthony was the silk stocking school."1o1 Under
the plan, the attendance areas of all three schools were combined:
Bryant and Anthony became 7th and 8th grade centers and Ramsey
became the 9th grade center for all children in the expanded at-
tendance area.' 0 2
In preparation for the program, the district offered human re-
lations training for teachers and a project for parents and students
to share their thoughts on racial issues and ways to reduce ra-
cism.' 0 3 According to news accounts, the beginning of the plan in
the fall of 1973 "was not without its share of fist fights on buses,
confrontations in halls and white girls afraid to go into restrooms
('They'll stick you with pins,' one girl said she was told)."104 Both
black and white youngsters were initially apprehensive about their
contacts with children of different races, but after only a few
months, the plan appeared to be working. 05
A The District Seeks Modifications
The district's entire program for eliminating segregation in
the elementary grades was to take effect in the fall of 1974.106 At
that time, no school was to have more than a 35% minority enroll-
100. George Hage, Junior High Parents Relaxed But Puzzled By Transfer Plan,
MINNEAOmS STAR, Aug. 23, 1973, at 6A.
101. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 10, at 646-47 (Bryant had 43% minority en-
rollment prior to implementation of the desegregation plan; Anthony had 2% minor-
ity enrollment).
102. Zeke Wigglesworth, School Desegregation Fears Quieted, MINNEAPOUs STAR,
Apr. 29, 1974, at LA.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. E.g., Id. at 2A; Busing: After a Trial, How Is It Working?, MmNEAPOus STAR,
Apr. 29, 1974, at lB. One seventh grade black girl attending Anthony said, "When I
first came here I was kind of scared because I was used to being around black
kids.... But after awhile I got to know some of the kids and now I have some friends
that are white and everything is OK." Id. A thirteen year old white girl at Bethune
had similar feelings: "When I first started going there, I was very afraid ... But
that's all changed... The whole thing, well, it's working like great." Zeke Wiggles-
worth, It's Working Like Great, MnuaqAPoms STAR, Apr. 29, 1974, at lB.
106. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799, 810 (D. Minn. 1972).
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ment. As the time for compliance approached, however, the district
asked Judge Larson to modify his order to more closely conform to
the district's original plan.1O7 The district requested the court to
allow up to 40% minority enrollment, if the district could obtain the
approval of the state Commissioner of Education.OS
Although State Board of Education guidelines generally im-
posed a 30% ceiling on minority enrollment, the guidelines did al-
low the Commissioner of Education to approve up to 40% minority
enrollment upon a showing of a justifiable "educational reason."10 9
The district listed a number of reasons to explain why minority en-
rollment would likely exceed the court-ordered 35% maximum in
several schools even after the district had planned for full imple-
mentation of the desegregation plan. The major reasons included
inaccurate projections regarding minority housing patterns, a
larger decline than anticipated in total school enrollment and de-
lays in construction of new school buildings intended to alleviate
racial segregation within the district.110
Judge Larson rejected as "cumbersome and unwise" the dis-
trict's proposal to inject the approval of the Commissioner of Educa-
tion into the case."' He did allow some small departures from the
35% limit, based on the increase in minority enrollment from 14.5%
in 1972 to 17.7% in 1974.112 The court refused, however, to modify
its order for schools with relatively high minority enrollments.
With regard to these schools, Judge Larson stated:
the District has been on notice since May 1972 that the Court
would insist on full implementation of the Plan as of the open-
ing of the school year this fall. In accordance with the previous
rulings in this case, the Court cannot tolerate such huge racial
imbalance, in excess of 45% minority enrollment in four of the
schools (Mann, Madison, Clinton, and Greeley), for another
school year.' 13
107. 1972 Transcript, supra note 13, at 2.
108. Id.
109. See Regulations Relating to Equality of Educational Opportunity and School
Desegregation, EDU 620-639 (Sept. 10, 1973) (cited in Booker, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip
op. at 2) (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 1974).
110. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 2 (D.
Minn. Apr. 24, 1974).
111. Id. The court noted that the State Board's guidelines were "too new to per-
mit a determination of the effectiveness and facility with which they may be admin-
istered. It is also uncertain what constitutes a valid 'educational reason' for
purposes of allowing up to 40% minority enrollment in a school." Id.
112. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at 9. In the fall of 1973, both Mann and Madison Elementary Schools had
minority enrollments exceeding 51%; Clinton and Greeley Elementary Schools ex-
ceeded 45%. Id. at 7-8. All four schools were located in south-central Minneapolis.
The court also refused to delay implementation of the desegregation order at
another south-central area school, Phillips Junior High School. The projected minor-
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The school board initially voted 4 to 2 to seek a rehearing of
Judge Larson's order, against the advice of attorney Newhall. Two
weeks later, the board reversed itself, voting unanimously to imple-
ment the court's order by offering an expanded system of alterna-
tive educational styles for parents to choose from.114 "One of the
[district's] objectives was to get parents to make choices based on
educational style, not location," with the idea that desegregation
would result as attendance areas were combined.115
Superintendent Davis played an instrumental role in present-
ing the alternatives concept to Minneapolis educators. When asked
about the concept of quality education in the context of desegrega-
tion, attorney Quaintance offered this perspective on the Minneapo-
lis experience:
I think that [Superintendent] Davis will be remembered in
Minneapolis and in this country as being a very imaginative
educator and one who has made a substantial contribution
through this concept of alternative schools....
The way that I saw it, and this is something that would
be difficult to verify, but I think that Dr. Davis wouldn't disa-
gree that... the integration suit was a vehicle for implement-
ing the introduction or expansion of the concept of alternative
schools in Minneapolis. The integration plan was also the vehi-
cle or the excuse for the implementation of a major construction
program - an expenditure of some $19 million in new
construction.
... and Judge Larson carried a heavy load on his back
I mean he was the man who provided the vehicle.., not only
for implementing integration which a majority of the [school]
board has believed would be appropriate and good for those it
serves, but also the [implementation] of the alternative system
[and] the new construction program.1 16
In the fall of 1974, district schools opened with an expanded
menu of educational alternatives: contemporary, continuous pro-
ity enrollment at Phillips was in the 40-45% range for fall 1974 and the court found
no offsetting factors that would lower the percentage of minority students attending
Phillips in the future. Id. at 3.
114. Sam Newland, School Board Won't Ask Rehearing By Judge, MNEAPOLIS
Tara., May 29, 1974, at 2B. The concept of alternatives was first implemented in
Minneapolis in 1971, when the district received a $7 million dollar grant to launch
the Southeast Alternatives program in southeast Minneapolis. Gregor W. Pinney,
What Kind of Education is Best? You Do Have Choice, MiNNEAoxs TRIB., Aug. 25,
1974, at 1E. School Board Chair Richard Allen first promoted the idea of choice in
1972 as a means of making school desegregation more acceptable to opponents. Gre-
gor W. Pinney, Busing Foes Oppose School-Choice Plan, MaNF-AsoLIs Tam., Feb. 3,
1972, at 1A. The concept was primarily limited to the southeast program until the
school board decided to use alternatives as a means of complying with Judge Lar-
son's order for the fall of 1974. Id.
115. Pinney, What Kind of Education Is Best?, supra note 114, at 1E, 8E.
116. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 444-46.
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gress, open, modified open and free school programs."l 7 Although
desegregation proceeded peacefully,"l8 the district's mid-year re-
port to the court indicated there were still "some problems left to
solve."119 A total of fifteen schools exceeded the court's 35% minor-
ity ceiling for the fall of 1974, and as many as eleven schools were
projected to continue above 35% minority enrollment for the follow-
ing year as well.120
School officials offered no plan to remedy the situation, and
instead sought to "stabilize" school attendance areas rather than
require another redistribution of students to achieve compliance.121
Plaintiffs opposed any "stabilization" period and sought an order
mandating compliance by September, 1975.122 In response to
plaintiffs' request, Judge Larson acknowledged the district's con-
cern that "[i]t is becoming extremely difficult to offer students and
parents any stability in their educational program if the increasing
minority population, citywide, requires an annual redistribution of
students."123 Recognizing that the minority population of the dis-
trict was projected to reach 20% by September, 1975, the judge in-
creased the 35% enrollment ceiling to 42% and ordered that no
117. Pinney, What Kind of Education Is Best?, supra note 114, at 1E, 8E. The
school district continues to implement the concept of alternative educational styles
today. The most traditional alternative style is "contemporary" where students are
grouped by grade level and spend most of their time in one self-contained classroom
with one teacher. In "continuous progress" schools, there is more grouping and re-
grouping for different subjects, and students move ahead at their own pace. In an
"open" or "modified open" school, students spend their time in one or more rooms
that have many "interest centers;" students and teachers may work together to de-
velop themes around which learning takes place. In a "free" school, the student
chooses the area of study and is primarily responsible for his or her own learning
process. Id. at IE.
118. One reporter revisited several people who had expressed reservations about
desegregation in 1972, including a white woman from northeast Minneapolis who
did not want her children "bused across the river." See Pinney, supra note 72. The
woman's daughter began attending a school "across the river" - Bethune Elemen-
tary School - in the fall of 1974 as part of the desegregation process. The women
told reporters she had decided to help make the desegregation plan work. "Times
are changing and you have to change with them," she said. "Another thing - when
the federal government tells you to do something, you do it." Peg Meier, Nancy Skin-
ner at Bethune School, MiNNEmPoLs Tam., Sept. 5, 1974, at 1B, 2B.
119. Report Card For the Schools, MnqNEA OLis TRis., Dec. 7, 1974, at 6A.
120. Gregor W. Pinney, City School Officials Ask More Time To Integrate, MINNE-
APOLIS TRI., Jan. 8, 1975, at 1A, 4A.
121. Max Nichols, Schools Note Imbalance But Plan No New Busing, MLNmFAso-
Lis STAR, Jan. 18, 1975, at A, 2A.
122. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 1 (D.
Minn. May 7, 1975).
123. Id. at 3.
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single minority group constitute more than 35% of the population
on any school campus.124
These revised guidelines resolved the projected noncompliance
of all schools, with the exception of Bethune Elementary School.
Principal George McDonough told the court that 50% of Bethune's
students were minority students because of an increasing minority
population in the Bethune attendance area in north-central Minne-
apolis.125 McDonough also cited increasing parochial school enroll-
ment among white students in the northeast Minneapolis area, the
area from which the district sought to attract majority students to
attend Bethune.126 Plaintiffs argued that without further action by
the district, parents of white students would not choose Bethune's
continuous progress program for their children because of Be-
thune's history as "an identifiable black school."127 The court's or-
der stated:
Although the Court has been inclined to resolve doubts as to
anticipated enrollments in favor of the School District's projec-
tions, it will not do so in regard to Bethune. That school is a
constant reminder of the segregationist policy of the District in
the 1960's. The injury resulting from that policy has never
been adequately remedied. The Court will order the District to
provide in 10 days a plan that will ensure that each school in
the Bethune-Hall-Holland-Webster Cluster will be in compli-
ance with the revised minority limits for the coming school
year. 128
The district produced a plan, and school began in the fall of
1975 with more than 11,000 children riding buses as part of the
district's desegregation effort.129 Half of the city's 82 public ele-
mentary and secondary schools were now affected by the court's or-
der.130 As part of its effort to comply with Judge Larson's revised
124. Id. at 2. The court also specifically noted the increase in Native American
students in south-central Minneapolis. Although Native American students consti-
tuted less than 5% of the total student enrollment in the district, the district pro-
jected that approximately 31% of the school population at Phillips Junior High
School and at the new Anderson Elementary School (scheduled for completion in
1976) would be Native American. Id.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. In his 1972 findings of fact, Judge Larson stated, "It is hard to imagine how a
school could be more clearly denominated a Black school' unless the words them-
selves had been chiseled over the door." Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 351
F. Supp. 799, 803 (D. Minn. 1972). In his 1975 order, the judge indicated that Be-
thune had always had at least 50% minority enrollment since it opened in 1968.
Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 4 (D. Minn. May
7, 1975).
128. Booker, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 4-5 (D. Minn. May 7, 1975).
129. Gregor W. Pinney, Two Areas to Join City School Plan for Desegregation,




order, the district brought children from two predominately white
areas of Minneapolis - the Putnam Elementary School neighbor-
hood in northeast Minneapolis and the Calhoun Elementary School
area in south Minneapolis - into the desegregation process.'13
B. Civil Rights Commission Advisory Committee
Proceedings
In the spring of 1976, Minneapolis participated in a United
States Civil Rights Commission study designed to gain perspective
on the effectiveness of the desegregation process throughout the
country.i3 2 The study included formal hearings in Boston, Massa-
chusetts; Denver, Colorado; Louisville, Kentucky; and Tampa, Flor-
ida. State advisory committees also held open meetings in
Berkeley, California; Corpus Christi, Texas; Stanford, California;
and Minneapolis, Minnesota.' 33
Lupe Lope, Director for Westside Ramsey Action Programs,
Inc., chaired Minneapolis' state advisory committee.134 The com-
mittee convened for three days in April, 1976 to gather information
on the success of the desegregation effort in Minneapolis and the
factors which influenced the course of desegregation in the city's
schools. The committee heard from teachers, administrators, par-
ents, students and others affected by the Booker litigation and the
court's continuing jurisdiction over the schools.135
After considering the comments made during the open meet-
ings in April, Civil Rights Commission staff concluded:
* The goal of desegregation - the physical redistribution
of students in compliance with the court's order - had been
achieved in some, but not all, of Minneapolis' schools. The inte-
131. Id. at lB. "The new busing program began smoothly and most of the reluc-
tant parents decided to try to make it work." Id. at 8B. See also Gregor W. Pinney,
School Desegregation Continues, MINNEAPOLIs TRIB., Dec. 29, 1975, at 1B, 2B. The
relatively peaceful desegregation process in Minneapolis contrasted sharply with the
process in cities such as Boston, where a court-ordered desegregation plan for South
Boston High was met with repeated violence and disruption. Resistance to desegre-
gation was so strong in Boston that United States District Judge Garrity was forced
to appoint his own administrator to run the school. Id. at B2. Violence erupted else-
where in the country as well, and in 1975 sociologist James Coleman released new
research which suggested desegregation was responsible for driving whites out of
major cities. Id.
132. Staff Report, supra note 9, at 5.
133. See id.
134. Also on the committee were Father Frank Zaragoa, James Kirk, Carmelo
Melende, Margaret Johnson, Robert Dodor, Iwan Fertig, Gloria Kumagai, Jeanne
Cooper, Greg Barrow, Dr. John Taborn, Duane Lindstrom and Clark 0. Roberts.
Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 2.
135. Staff Report, supra note 9, at 2.
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gration portion of the school district's plan had yet to be fully
implemented.
* Some nearly all-white schools had not been included in
the district's desegregation plan, and the district had failed to
recognize that the maintenance of such schools constituted
segregation.
* Although incidents of physical disruption and violence
had been minimal during the desegregation process, there was
vocal opposition to the desegregation plan. According to at
least one parent, the lack of violence resulted not from a lack of
opposition, but rather from a "law abiding citizenry who really
did not care to stand up and start throwing rocks at each
other."
* Many elements of the community - the school board,
school administration, teachers, business leaders, religious
leaders, some parents, the media - participated to some extent
in formulating the desegregation plan, and had been supportive
of desegregation efforts. 136
When state advisory committee members asked participants
in the April meetings about the effect of the federal court case on
the district's desegregation efforts, school board member Rev.
David Preus responded:
I think it was essential that we - it was simply needed as a
way of saying to what I believe to be a fundamentally law-abid-
ing citizenry that this is what the United States Government is
calling for, and even if we may not like it, it's time to swallow
and say, "Let's see if it works."13 7
Marvin Trammel, a former west area superintendent for the
district, identified three elements which in his view contributed to
the degree of success the district had achieved in desegregating its
schools: first, the participation of numerous groups in formulating
the desegregation plan, which created a "broad base of support;"
second, the court order telling "the school district to desegregate its
schools;" and third, the generally positive support for desegregation
from the district's teachers.' 38 In concluding his remarks before
the Advisory Committee, Trammel advocated continued monitoring
of the desegregation process by the court:
I would urge this group and others to very strongly recommend
that this school district.., continue to be under the jurisdiction
of the Federal court in terms of its plan for desegregation. And
I state that because I think that while the other factors which I
mentioned are very important.., the Court has been a stabiliz-
ing factor in keeping the desegregation plan going for a period
of years. And I think that if the Court were to withdraw its
136. See Staff Report, supra note 9, at 9, 16.
137. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 75.
138. Id. at 283.
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jurisdiction of the case, the potential for losing that impetus, I
think, would become glaring.13 9
School board member Harry Davis also favored "remaining
under the court order for a considerable length of time" for what
Davis characterized as "practical" reasons:
School Board [members] in the city of Minneapolis and other
major cities are political people, and they respond to the electo-
rate. And the electorate does not always say that you should
provide the same quality education [for all children]....
I think that the court - even if the court is well coordi-
nated with the Minneapolis school system, as Judge Larson's
court is - that the court needs to serve as a conscience to those
in responsibility, not only on the School Board but the general
public and the administration.14o
Others were not so eager to continue under the court's juris-
diction. Former superintendent Davis told the advisory committee,
"[w]ell, I would say that before I left the Minneapolis School Dis-
trict, my commitment was to have firmly established our capability
of doing it ourselves and the withdrawal of the court from the case
would have been viewed, you know, with happiness.14 1
C. The District Again Fails to Achieve Compliance
Shortly after the advisory committee concluded its proceed-
ings in Minneapolis, the school district revealed that seven of the
district's schools had exceeded the court's revised student enroll-
ment guidelines, which allowed a total minority enrollment of
42%. 142 Officials predicted that various adjustments could ensure
compliance at six of the schools for the upcoming 1976-77 school
year, but the seventh school - North High School - would remain
out of compliance.1 43
Along with its report, the district filed a motion requesting au-
thorization to continue a voluntary programmatic desegregation
plan for North High School, instead of redrawing school boundary
lines to achieve desegregation goals.14 4 Under the voluntary pro-
gram, North was paired with two predominately white schools -
Edison and Henry High Schools across the Mississippi River in
139. Id. at 305-06.
140. Id. at 326-27.
141. Id. at 422.
142. 8th Semi-Annual Report Under Order of May 24, 1972, Booker v. Special
School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382 (June 30, 1976).
143. Id. at 1.
144. In the proceedings before the Civil Rights Commission advisory committee,
plaintiffs' counsel expressed concern "about what the situation is now at a few of the




northeast Minneapolis. Under the HEN program, an acronym com-
prised of the initials of each school,145 students could sign up for
courses and attend school for part of the day at "each others'
schools."146 The district also filed a motion requesting for the first
time that housing officials be joined as third-party defendants in
the litigation.147
On August 12, 1976, the court granted both motions.148 With
regard to the district's proposal to rely on voluntary transfers to
achieve desegregation at North High, Judge Larson stated:
The parties to this action, their counsel, and the Court have
agreed throughout these proceedings that the United States
Constitution requires that the schools be integrated. The de-
fendants have made a sincere effort to comply with the various
Orders that have been made. In view of the defendants' gener-
ally successful and good faith integration of students and
faculty, the motion of defendants for relaxation of the require-
ments for North High for one year should be granted.' 49
Although the court granted the district's motion for North High
School to continue to operate "in status quo," the court also ruled
that the district should "vigorously pursue the plans for program-
matic desegregation."150
Although the district appeared poised to achieve compliance
with the court's revised order for the 1976-77 school year, enroll-
ment figures for the fall of 1976 brought news which "dismayed"
school officials.151 Instead of just one school - North High - re-
porting a total minority enrollment which exceeded the court's
guidelines, thirteen schools reported minority enrollments exceed-
ing 42%.152 The seven schools which had been out of compliance
the year before all "got worse instead of better in terms of minority
percentages," and six more schools were added to the list of those
failing to comply with the court's minority enrollment
maximums.15 3
School officials believed federal housing policies contributed to
the district's continued inability to achieve compliance with the
145. Gregor W. Pinney, North's Transfer Plan Allowed, MINNEAPOLIs Tam., Aug.
13, 1976, at 1A.
146. Gregor W. Pinney, 13 Schools in City Top Racial Limits, MiNNEAPOLIs Tam.,
Dec. 14, 1976, at 1A, 8A.
147. See infra notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
148. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71-Civ. 382 (D. Minn. Aug. 12,
1976).
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id.
151. Desegregation Setback, MNEAPoLIS STAR, Dec. 16, 1976, at 18A.
152. Id.
153. Gregor W. Pinney, 13 Schools in City Top Racial Limits, MIN-EAoLs TRmI.,
Dec. 14, 1976, at 1A, 8A.
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court's desegregation orders. According to attorney Newhall, "the
present concentrations of minorities [in the schools] are not our
fault, but was also based on the city's housing patterns.I5 4 The
news of the district's fall 1976 enrollments prompted school board
chair John Mason to question whether the district should rethink
its objectives: "I'm not sure that an annual response is the best ap-
proach from an educational or moral view ... It may be that we will
decide that we can't achieve a certain percentage each year and
should so advise the appropriate agencies."SS
IV. The District Seeks Termination of Court Oversight:
1977-1978
A month after the district found that thirteen of its schools
failed to comply with the court's desegregation order, school board
members met for an informal discussion of the desegregation pro-
cess. ' 5 6 Although the board "took no votes and made no final deci-
sions, it seemed to be growing weary of desegregation - more so
than at any other time in the six years of racial mixing in Minneap-
olis."'57 Board members "backed away" from promising Judge Lar-
son that they would devise a plan to achieve compliance before
school started in the fall:
Board Chairman John Mason said he wanted to skip the
promises and simply give the court the facts in the forthcoming
semi-annual report. He implied it would then be up to the pro-
integration plaintiffs to try to persuade the court [to act]. 158
Comments from other board members indicated that they
shared Mason's views. Board member James Pommerenke said, "I
think it's time... [to tell] the court there's plenty of commitment to
quality education and that we don't want the court telling us how to
run the school system."15 9 Board member Harry Davis "was the
only one .. . who firmly disagreed with the idea that segregation
has been eliminated. He said he still wants all schools to be
brought into compliance."' 60
The plaintiffs responded to the district's semi-annual report
by filing a motion requesting the court to order the district to sub-
154. Mike McCabe, Some Schools Still Violating Race-Mix Rule, MNNEAPOLis
STAR, Dec. 13, 1976, at 1A, 9A.
155. Gregor W. Pinney, 13 Schools in City Top Racial Limits, MINNEmPOms TRiB.,
Dec. 14, 1976, at 1A, 8A. See also Desegregation Setback, supra note 151, at 18A.
156. Gregor W. Pinney, School Desegregation Effort Seen Fading, MuNAPOLs
ThiB., Jan. 28, 1977, at 1A
157. Id.





mit a plan which would assure full desegregation of the district's
student population.'16 Two days later, the district filed a motion
requesting the court to terminate its jurisdiction,162 citing
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler.S3 The district ar-
gued that in Spangler, the United States Supreme Court had ruled
that "once a court-ordered desegregation plan is fully implemented
the District Court may not periodically re-enter the fray to order
rearrangement of attendance districts to 'correct' racial imbalances
arising since that implementation."'164
After hearing from counsel for both parties, Judge Larson re-
fused to end the court's involvement in the Booker litigation.165
The court's order distinguished Spangler by noting that:
[i]n Pasadena, all of the city's schools were integrated at one
time, with the proportion of racial minorities in each school be-
low a given limit, within one year of the court order. While var-
ious schools gradually slipped out of compliance over the next
few years, there was an identifiable point in time at which all of
the city's schools were integrated within the limits set by the
Court. In Minneapolis, such an identifiable point of total com-
pliance has never existed; indeed, Minneapolis' plan is more
akin to the type of "step at a time" plan which the Supreme
Court specifically excluded from application of its holding.16 6
In response to the district's argument that any slippage from
compliance was due to "demographic changes and discrimination in
housing,"' 6 7 Judge Larson observed that the demographic trends in
the City of Minneapolis should have been taken into account in
planning school assignments, the district had to be on notice that
Minneapolis would be touched by the nationwide trend towards in-
creasing minority concentration in the city core. Indeed, it was the
recognition of this trend that caused the district to begin planning
for desegregation even before the Booker complaint was filed.16s
161. Motion of Plaintiffs for Order Requiring Defendants to Submit Plan to As-
sure Compliance Re: Student Enrollment, at 1, Booker v. Special School District No.
1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382 (D. Minn. May 5, 1977).
162. Motion of Defendants to Terminate Litigation, Booker v. Special School Dis-
trict No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382 (D. Minn. May 7, 1977).
163. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
164. Id. at 437.
165. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382 (D. Minn. July 11,
1977).
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id. at 3 (the school district had previously joined HUD and the Minneapolis
Housing and Redevelopment Authority as third party defendants).
168. Id. at 3. The court did not fault school administrators, however, for failing to
plan for the great increase in Native American students at the Hans Christian An-
derson complex in the south-central area of the city. The minority enrollment at
Anderson reached 53% in the fall of 1976. Approximately 35% of the students at
Anderson were Native American. Id. at 5 & n.1.
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The court's July 1977 order rejected an immediate end to the
litigation. However, Judge Larson also gave both parties notice that
"unlike the District Court in Spangler,... this Court does not fore-
see retaining jurisdiction over this matter for the rest of its life."169
Ordering the district to "provide for full student desegregation by
the fall of 1978,"170 the court observed:
in this period of rapidly dropping enrollments, which makes
school closings necessary anyway, the District is in an ideal po-
sition to accomplish two goals with one set of actions: respond-
ing appropriately to the fact of lower enrollments, and
providing, once and for all, for full desegregation in the
schools.171
Response to the court's ruling was mixed. A black community
newspaper ran an editorial urging the district to heed the court's
order.' 72 The editorial criticized the district's past efforts, stating:
Five years have passed since the initial order and two years
have passed since the District was to complete total desegrega-
tion. In fact, there are now more schools out of compliance with
the court's guidelines than five years ago...
The District has dragged its feet in taking this long to de-
segregate its student body. And it has been done piecemeal.
The District has always been distracted by public pressure not
to desegregate. These pressures still influence its decisions, es-
pecially in the east and north areas... Adding a school here and
a school there, year after year, to the desegregation plan works
against the kind of stability students and community should ex-
pect, and only serves to keep feelings stirred up, diverting tal-
ent and energies our students and faculties could use to good
advantage. 173
The school board initially requested Judge Larson to recon-
sider his order.174 School board chair John Mason announced the
board's decision, adding, "I hope people won't make the mistake of
confusing our legal posture with our commitment to desegregation
and integration of our schools."175 Judge Larson denied the board's
request and advised the district to pursue its right to appeal to the
169. Id. at 3.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 4.
172. All Deliberate Speed: The Status of School Desegregation in Minneapolis,
MNNEAoLIs SpomEsMAN, July 7, 1977, at 2.
173. Id.
174. Gregor W. Pinney, Schools Will Ask Release By Court, MmNE mms TRB.,
Aug. 5, 1977, at IA. Board members Pommerenke, Olson, Mason and Borea voted to
request the court to reconsider its decision. Board member Davis was the lone dis-




Eighth Circuit if the district believed its motion to terminate the
case was wrongly decided. 176 The district did not appeal.
Instead, when the district filed its semi-annual report in De-
cember, 1977, it requested a hearing to describe more fully the dis-
trict's plans for the future.177 School board members and top
officials attended the hearing on January 26, 1978. At the hearing,
attorneys for the school districtl78 presented a slide show and sum-
mary of the district's accomplishments since the court assumed ju-
risdiction of the case in 1972. The attorneys advised the court that
the district would present a "preferred" five year desegregation plan
to the court in March of 1978. If the preferred plan did not meet the
court's current desegregation guidelines, the district would also
present a plan designed to ensure compliance with the court's order
that total minority enrollment not exceed 42% at any school and
that no one minority group constitute more than 35% at any school.
Plaintiffs responded to the materials presented and to the district's
proposed five year "preferred" plan by expressing concern about the
district's lack of commitment to meeting the court's guidelines:
The concern that we have ... is what we perceive as a lack of
commitment to carrying out the order of this Court of July,
1977.... we can see from what has been presented, that this
district is able to bring together a massive amount of talent and
resources to get a job done. We believe that that talent and
those resources should be directed to getting the job done that
the Court ordered it to do, rather than another job. 179
A The District Develops a 'Preferred" Plan
At the time of the hearing in January, 1978, the district had
only begun to develop the five year plan it had promised to deliver
to Judge Larson by March.180 In February, 1978 the district un-
veiled four proposals to the public.' 8 ' Each of the proposals con-
templated some additional busing.' 8 2 The district scheduled
meetings at two area high schools to obtain input from interested
parents.' 8 3
176. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 2 (D.
Minn. Aug. 8, 1977).
177. Transcript of Hearing at 2, Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71
Civ. 382 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 1978).
178. Attorney Norman Newhall was joined at the hearing by attorney Duane
Khronke, who had recently begun to advise the district on the case. Id. at 1.
179. Id. at 23, 28.
180. Id. at 14.
181. Gregor W. Pinney, Crowd Opposes Further Busing, MInmEAows TRm., Feb.





At the Jordan Junior High School meeting in north Minneapo-
lis almost 900 people - most of them white - turned out "primar-
ily to tell the Minneapolis School Board that further busing for
desegregation is a bad idea."184 News accounts stated that:
The crowd [at Jordan] was as large as the ones back in 1970
and 1971 when busing was a new idea in Minneapolis, and the
people said a lot of the same things they had said back in those
years: that busing damages the family, destroys community
identity, wastes money, drives students into private schools,
makes parents move out of the city, and accomplishes
nothing.185
Alderman Walter Dziedzic spoke at the meeting of a strong
sense of family and community in northeast Minneapolis which he
felt would be altered by busing. "It's not a racial issue," he said,
"but a question of whether or not their children can attend neigh-
borhood schools."186 County Commissioner Sam Sivanich, who also
represented the northeast Minneapolis area, added, "I wish Judge
Larson would come out into the community and see what the city of
Minneapolis is."187
The meeting at Jordan was described as "quiet" and "re-
strained," compared to the meeting held at Folwell Junior High in
south Minneapolis several days later.
[At Folwell] Minneapolis School Board members took verbal
potshots at each other. A man and a woman were forcibly
ejected for shouting obscenities. Former Mayor Charles
Stenvig was waving a placard [that said No Forced Busing].
There were shouts, jeers, threats and pleas [as] the audience of
about 700 persons let it be known - loudly and often with hos-
tility - that it opposed busing. 8 8
School board member James Pommerenke took the floor and asked
everyone opposed to busing to stand because he wanted Judge Lar-
son to see a picture of the opponents in Friday's newspapers. "It
seemed that nearly everyone in the auditorium stood up."' 8 9
Although the audience at Folwell was mostly white, some
blacks and Native Americans also attended. A delegation from An-
derson school requested that the district exempt Anderson from the
184. Id. (under the school board's proposal for north and northeast Minneapolis,
"virtually every school in the area would be involved" in desegregation). Nancy
Paulu, School Board Hears Criticism of Busing Plan, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 22,
1978, at 19A.
185. Pinney, supra note 181, at lB.
186. Paulu, supra note 184, at A19.
187. Pinney, supra note 181, at 1B, 6B.
188. Nancy Paulu, Antdiusing Sentiment Shakes Rafters At City School-Desegre-
gation Hearing, MNmPOLS STAR, Feb. 24, 1978, at 1A.
189. Gregor W. Pinney, School Busing Hearing Heated, MINNAI'oms Thus., Feb.
24, 1978, at 1A, 6A.
[Vol. 12:127
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
court's order. The delegation sought to allow Anderson to operate
with a significant percentage of Native American students.190 The
school board's "preferred plan" did allow any school with between
15% and 30% Native American students to have a total minority
enrollment of 60%.191 The plan contemplated that for other
schools, the total minority enrollment would not exceed 50%, an in-
crease from the court's existing 42% minority enrollment maxi-
mum. 19 2 The plan also contemplated continued voluntary
programmatic desegregation at North, Henry and Edison High
Schools and expanded use of alternative teaching styles to achieve
further desegregation.193 District officials believed the preferred
plan was the most feasible option, given the segregated housing
patterns which persisted in the city, as well as the increasing
number of minority students served by the district.194
At the court hearing in March, the district renewed its motion
to terminate the litigation completely and presented "a massive
amount of data (the total package of briefs weighed 14 pounds) to
prove that desegregation had already been accomplished."195 In
the alternative, the district moved for approval of the preferred
plan for student enrollment.' 9 6 The district also presented a plan
that complied with the court's existing requirement that no school
have a total minority enrollment exceeding 42%, and that no one
minority group constitute more than 35% of the total population at
each school.197 District staff plainly did not support this plan, how-
190. Nancy Paulu, Antibusing Sentiment Shakes Rafters at City School-Desegre-
gation Hearing, MmINEAPoms STAR, Feb. 24, 1978, at 1A, 5A.
191. "Where Native American students comprised 30% of the school population,
the preferred plan allowed the overall minority population to rise to 60%. Where
Native American students comprised 15% of the school population, the overall mi-
nority population could rise to 55%." Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 451 F.
Supp. 659, 664, n.8 (D. Minn. 1978).
192. Id. at 665.
193. Id. at 666.
194. Plaintiffs' counsel objected strongly to the time and resources the district had
devoted to developing a 50%/50% five year plan, when the court's order required the
district to develop a plan to comply with the existing 42%/35% guidelines for the fall
of 1978.
195. Gregor W. Pinney, Larson Orders Increased School Desegregation," MINNEAP-
oLs Tam., May 23, 1978, at 1A, 12A.
196. The district's 50%/50% plan was to remain in effect from 1978 through 1983.
The district estimated that in the fall of 1978, the student body would be approxi-
mately 26% minority, with an 18% black and a 6% Native American enrollment. The
district projected that by 1983, 35% of the student body would be students of color.
The district assured the court that it could ensure compliance with its preferred plan
for three years. 1978 Transcript, supra note 8, at 11-12.
197. Id. at 12.
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ever, labeling it "educationally unsound, disruptive to the educa-
tional process, and lacking in durability."198
Minneapolis School Superintendent Raymond Arveson testi-
fied in favor of the district's preferred plan. Arveson told the court
the 50%150% plan would promote more stability in student assign-
ments in a time of decreasing overall enrollment.1 99 Board member
Harry Davis also indicated his support for the 50%/50% plan. Davis
believed the 42%/35% plan could work, but he believed the 50%/50%
plan was more workable and more likely to be achieved by the dis-
trict.200 When pressed by counsel for the plaintiffs, Davis agreed
that his support for the 50%/50% plan was, in part, based on his
assessment of what was politically possible. 2 01
Davis opposed the district's request to terminate the litigation,
however, and he urged the court to continue its involvement in the
case to ensure the school district achieved the goal of desegrega-
tion.2 0 2 Others voiced their support for the court's continued asser-
tion of jurisdiction as well. Central High School Principal Joyce
Jackson offered her view that the district's commitment to desegre-
gation had diminished in recent years.2 03 NAACP President Julia
Cherry described to the court the reluctance she perceived on the
part of some school board members even to consider a plan that
would comply with the court's existing guidelines.20 4
198. Id.
199. Id. at 30-35. Judge Larson advised the parties that he had received a mas-
sive number of letters objecting to the continual movement of children. He further
acknowledged the problems parents had communicated to him concerning the lack of
stability in school assignments. Id. at 38.
200. Id. at 88-89, 294-96.
201. Davis testified as follows in response to questioning by attorney Quaintance:
Q: Let me ask you the question again: Is one reason you supported
the 50/50 Plan that you sense a decrease in the degree of commitment
to desegregation/integration?
A: To a lesser degree, that might be a reason, yes.
Q: You believe that half a loaf is better than none and it is better to do
what is politically possible on the Board than to isolate yourself, is that
correct?
A: Let me qualify that because again, I have to establish my own goals
and I have established goals. My goal and commitment is to quality
integrated education and I have to try to find it and to use strategy to
accomplish that with the kinds of issues that are before me, and that
includes commitment of my colleagues as well as commitment of staff
and other people in the School District. So working that way, I feel I
have to adjust so that strategy can become a reality. There are all
kinds of variables and barriers that you have to contend with, or at
least I have to contend with.
Id. at 295-96.
202. Id. at 91, 296-98, 300-01.
203. Id. at 309.
204. Id. at 314.
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Cherry also told the court how she felt as a member of the
audience at the recent Folwell Junior High School meeting held to
discuss the district's desegregation plans: "I guess I had to keep
reminding myself that I was in Minneapolis, Minnesota in the year
1970 .... I was embarrassed - first angry and then embarrassed
because ... people across the nation .. look to Minneapolis for
leadership."205 Cherry told the court that the only response to de-
segregation issues she had heard from at least two current school
board members was, "[wie don't need a judge's Order."206 Cherry,
who grew up in South Carolina and attended segregated schools
there, added:
My reaction to that is I know there are a lot of good people in
Minneapolis. There are also a lot of good people in South Caro-
lina ... but sometimes there has to be some pressure brought to
bear to bring that good out in people. I think this suit is it.207
Cherry opposed the request of several Native American groups
to exempt Native Americans from the court's order and to prohibit
involuntary removal of Native American students from schools with
a Native American program.20 8 Cherry believed this request would
result in racially identifiable schools, and she testified, "I don't
think... the NAACP should be involved in setting a precedent for
segregated schools. We are not going back down that route."209
Two Native American educators testified in support of the dis-
trict's proposal to allow up to 60% minority enrollment in schools
with significant numbers of Native American students.210 Their
testimony echoed the remarks made by Jake Kanassatega, a Native
American educator who appeared before the U.S. Civil Rights Com-
mission advisory committee in April, 1976.211 Kanassatega agreed
then that the court's order had succeeded in "bringing black kids
and Indian kids and white kids together to be educated."212 Ac-
cording to Kanassatega however, the desegregation order had unin-
tended and unforeseen side effects which arose, in part, because
205. Id. at 313.
206. Id. at 318.
207. Id. at 314.
208. Judge Larson permitted attorney Larry Leventhal to present an amicus brief
on behalf of several Native American groups. The amicus brief requested the court
to exempt Native Americans from the court's order. Id. at 5. The school district did
not support Leventhal's request, but had incorporated a larger minority percentage
option when a significant number of students at a school were Native American. Id.
at 10; see supra note 191 (listing planned allowable minority student percentage dif-
ferences in schools with large numbers of Native American students).
209. 1978 Transcript, supra note 8, at 318-19.
210. The educators were Charles Robertson and Rosemary Christenson. Id. at
161, 185.
211. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 148.
212. Id. at 183.
1993]
Law and Inequality
"[t]he Native American concern was not even brought forth" at the
time of the court's initial ruling.213 No Native Americans were in-
volved in the court case when it was initially brought in 1971, and
only a small percentage of the district's students were Native Amer-
ican. 214 By 1978, the percentage of Native American students had
increased to 6%.215 Kanassatega told the advisory committee that
when the Booker complaint was initially filed by the plaintiffs: "[In-
dian people perceived] that it was not our problem. It was a black-
white problem. But, with the increasing numbers [of Indian stu-
dents], the effect has been... [w]e cannot provide the things that
will help meet the special educational needs of Indian children."216
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Stolee, presented a plan to the court
which would comply with the existing 42%/35% student enrollment
guidelines. 217 Stolee was impressed with the sincerity of the Na-
tive American educators who testified before the court at the March
hearing, but he added:
I must confess that as I sat listening to the testimony I had
feelings of deja vu - here we go again. The feelings are gener-
ated because ... I worked with desegregation in the south. I
heard the reasons, the rationale for the segregation of the races
in southern schools. The rationale that was given is that black
people and white people have different learning styles... I
heard the rationale that blacks and whites have different disci-
plinary styles. I heard the rationale that blacks and whites
have different cultural backgrounds.. . Therefore, because of
those things, it was best to educate black and white children
separately....
What I heard [in the testimony from the Native American
educators was that] we have a racial group that is so different
in learning styles, in disciplinary styles, in cultural background
that in essence they have to be segregated. That, I don't be-
lieve, should be permitted.218
213. Id. at 184. The same observation applies to the lack of involvement of other
minority groups as well. Franscisco Trejo, an Hispanic teacher, told the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission advisory committee that when desegregation first began, the
Hispanic or Chicano community was not even told by the district whether Hispanic
children were considered "minority" for purposes of complying with the court's order.
Trejo said he and other Hispanic people could talk with school officials about the
needs of Chicano students, but the meetings were "always based on a Chicano is-
sue... [we were not involved in a desegregation process." Id. at 906-07.
214. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799, 802 (D. Minn. 1972)
(in 1971-72, approximately 3% of the enrolled students were Native American).
215. Minneapolis School Racial Percentages, MiNNEAPoLs STAR, Dec. 8, 1978, at
17A.
216. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 184.
217. 1978 Transcript, supra note 8, at 21.
218. Id. at 259.
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B. The Court Insists on Full Compliance for Fall 1978
On May 22, 1978, Judge Larson issued an order denying the
district's motion to terminate the litigation. Nonetheless, the judge
agreed that some adjustment in the enrollment guidelines was war-
ranted.219 The court explained that, in the past, the enrollment
guidelines had been set approximately 20% above the total pro-
jected minority pupil population, a margin more generous than the
15% figure often used throughout the country. 220 Using the dis-
trict's projection that 26% of Minneapolis' public school students
would be minority in the fall of 1978, the court increased the maxi-
mum minority enrollment for each school in the district to 46% for
the fall of 1978. The court's order also raised the maximum for a
single minority group from no more than 35% to no more than 39%
of the total enrollment.221
The court's order reveals frustration with the district's failure
to attain full compliance with the court's previous desegregation
orders:
Perhaps the major difficulty with gradual implementation of
desegregation remedies is the tendency for planners to fail to
take into account predictable demographic trends and inevita-
ble errors in projections, sight counts, and other similar factors.
Unless allowances for such errors are built into the system,
noncompliance is virtually assured even where the district acts
in good faith. The Court is then placed in the position of ruling
on modification requests based on factors that ought properly to
have been foreseen by the planners in the first place. Although
the response to such requests must be flexible and reasonable
where the mistakes do not appear to have been motivated by
bad faith, this pattern threatens to so weaken the effectiveness
of a remedy that at some point it can no longer be tolerated.
Perhaps, despite repeated admonitions by the Court, the dis-
trict has never fully understood its responsibility to exercise
reasonable foresight and to plan by allowing a generous margin
for the errors and trends which, given its considerable ex-
perience, the district can readily anticipate. . . . the dis-
trict is hereby on notice that in the future neither the plea
of "increased minority enrollment" nor of other foreseeable
and predictable events will be deemed sufficient to
support a modification request or to further delay final
implementation. 22 2
Based on the court's "experience with the instability and potential
unreliability" of the district's efforts to monitor compliance with an-
219. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 451 F. Supp. 659, 661-64 (D. Minn.
1978).
220. Id. at 666.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 665.
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nual "sight counts," Judge Larson ruled that the district would
achieve full compliance with the court's desegregation order only if
every school in the district met the revised 46%/39% guidelines in
both the fall of 1978 and the fall of 1979.223
In response to the request for an exemption or variance for
Native American students, the court ruled that, while it was sensi-
tive to the special educational needs of Native American students
and the desire to maximize the expenditure of federal funds, "the
constitutionality of permitting a school board to maintain, increase,
or cause the segregation of Native Americans in the context of an
urban school desegregation case is highly doubtful."224 The court
found that it need not resolve the difficult constitutional questions
presented, however, because the district could meet and had met
the needs of Native American students by means other than pro-
moting segregation. 225
Commenting on Judge Larson's order, an editorial in the Min-
neapolis Star stated the court had "little choice but to turn down"
the school board's 50%/50% proposal, which the Star characterized
as "a formula for legitimizing existing racial segregation in the city
schools."226 Attorney Newhall and School Superintendent Arveson
urged the school board not to appeal the court's decision and in-
stead advised that the board develop a plan to implement it.227 De-
spite their advice, the board voted, 4 to 3, to appeal Judge Larson's
ruling to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.228 Both the Star and
the Tribune newspapers ran editorials opposing the board's deci-
sion.229 According to the Star editorial: "Some of the board mem-
bers who voted for an appeal say they merely want to bring the
litigation to an end. The irony is that they might have done that in
223. Id. at 666.
224. Booker, 451 F. Supp. at 667.
225. At the time of the court's opinion, the concentration of Native American stu-
dents at Anderson, which the district viewed as a model, was approximately 35%.
The court observed:
The Court does not mean to imply that the district has by any means
"solved" the deep and complex problems of educating Native American
children to realize their full potential; but the district has demonstrated
that promising approaches can be found in the context of an integrated
unitary school system.
Id. at 668.
226. No More Racial Foot-Dragging, MnqNEArmLxs STAR, May 24, 1978, at 18A.
227. Gregor W. Pinney, Board to Appeal Desegregation Rule, MHn'NEAOLIs TRIB.,
June 1, 1978, at 1A, 9A.
228. Board members Olson, Pommerenke, Borea and Mason voted to appeal the
court's decision. Board members Star, Davis and Lind voted against the appeal.
The board unanimously agreed, however, that the district should develop a plan to
comply with the court's order pending the appeal. Id.
229. Drop the Busing Appeal, MImNmAPoms STAR, June 2, 1978, at 8A, A Mistaken
Appeal by Minneapolis Schools, Manvm'Ows Tam., June 2, 1978, at 6A
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the first place by offering the court a more acceptable desegregation
plan."230
C. Budget Cutbacks and School Closings
Shortly after the district decided to appeal the court's May,
1978 order, the parties were back before Judge Larson on issues
relating to budget cutbacks; 231 a subject one school official termed
"our second major headache."232 The district anticipated that pro-
posed teacher layoffs would have a disparate impact on minority
teachers.233 State law required the district to lay off teachers based
on seniority.2 34 Because the school district hired many of its minor-
ity teachers after the court's 1972 order, the proposed cutbacks
would affect minority teachers disproportionately.235 In June, the
district presented the court with a motion to permit the retention of
minority teachers notwithstanding the state law or, in the alterna-
tive, permitting preferential rehiring of minority teachers.236 The
district advised the court that the proposed layoffs would not affect
the district's ability to comply with the court's faculty desegregation
order during the 1978-79 school year, but, if projections were accu-
rate, additional layoffs could make compliance difficult for the
1979-80 school year.23 7
230. Drop the Busing Appeal, supra note 229, at 8A.
231. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382 (D. Minn. June 19,
1978).
232. Nancy Paulu, City's Schools To Face $5-Million Budget Cut, Mn;NEPOLIs
STAR, Mar. 23, 1978, at 1A. In March 1978, Associate Superintendent Bernard Kaye
projected that the district would be forced to close about eight schools and lay off a
significant number of teachers before the fall of 1978. Id.
233. Nancy Paulu, Teacher Layoffs to Hit Minority Ranks Hard, MNNEAPOLis
STAR, June 13, 1978, at lB.
234. Id. (citing State Tenure Act).
235. In the spring of 1978, minority teachers accounted for approximately 10% of
the total number of teachers in the Minneapolis school system. The proposed layoffs
would decrease that percentage to approximately 9% for the 1978-79 school year.
Juana Duty & Dennis McGrath, Minority Teachers Feel "Left' By Judge, MINNEAPO-
Lis TRm., June 21, 1978, at 1A.
236. Id. ("Because of their lack of seniority, minority teachers represent about 20
percent... of the 240 teachers scheduled to be laid off").
237. Since 1972, the court's order had required that each secondary school have
approximately the same proportion of minority to majority teachers as there were
minority to majority teachers in the whole system. Booker v. Special School District
No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799, 810 (D. Minn. 1972). In response to plaintiffs' motion for
further relief, the court's 1973 order specifically required that minority teachers fill
at least six percent of the faculty positions at each secondary school. Booker v. Spe-
cial School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. May 8, 1973). The
court's order with regard to elementary school teachers required only that before any
school could hire additional minority teachers, every school must have at least one
minority teacher. Booker, 351 F. Supp. at 811.
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Plaintiffs expressed no view on the merits of the district's re-
quest to circumvent the seniority system, but argued the request
was premature because the issues were not yet ripe for considera-
tion.238 The Minneapolis Federation of Teachers filed an amicus
brief supporting the seniority system. The union's executive secre-
tary said the union felt "caught between wanting to retain minori-
ties, and protecting the seniority system which.., was crucial to
teachers."239 Some minority teachers expressed disappointment
with their union's position. They asserted that the Minneapolis
Federation of Teachers ignored its minority members when it failed
to push for an affirmative action policy in the previous teacher
contract.240
The teachers felt especially betrayed by a school system that
had recruited them from other teaching positions, only to abandon
them once they accepted a position with the district.241 Joyce Lake,
a black teacher at Jordan Junior High School in north Minneapolis,
told a news reporter in June of 1978 that it was difficult to be one of
only two minority teachers at Jordan when the school had almost a
48% minority enrollment.242 According to Lake, "we aren't just
talking about jobs. We are talking about minds. They [minority
students] need me, and they need other minority staff members....
we don't have nearly enough minority staff members right now."24 3
In a hearing before Judge Larson, the district argued that large mi-
nority teacher losses would reduce the district's ability to recruit
more minority faculty and would deny students the opportunity to
interact with and see minority persons in professional positions. 244
On June 19, 1978, the court ruled that it would not resolve the
issue of layoffs until the seniority law more directly affected the dis-
trict's ability to comply with the court's orders. Judge Larson em-
phasized, however, that the district remained free to present the
issue again "should circumstances change."245 Although minority
238. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 1 (D.
Minn. June 19, 1978).
239. Duty & McGrath, supra note 235, at 1A_
240. Id. (describing the effect of Judge Larson's decision to deny request to ex-
empt minority teachers from layoffs).
241. Id. "I was recruited by a system that's now cutting my neck," said Anthony
Queen, an eight-year veteran of the school system who was recruited from Baton
Rouge to come to Minneapolis. "And now I'm at the age where I've planted my roots
here, only to have them cut." Id.
242. Nancy Paulu, Teacher Layoffs To Hit Minority Ranks Hard, MmuiNEPolis
STAR, June 13, 1978, at lB.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 1 (D.
Minn. June 19, 1978).
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teachers were unhappy with the court's ruling, school board mem-
bers indicated they would pursue other means to retain as many
minority teachers as possible.246
The second issue brought before the court during the summer
of 1978 involved a challenge to the school board's decision to close
Longfellow Elementary School to comply with the court's revised
46%/39% minority enrollment guidelines.247 Parents of Longfellow
students attempted to intervene in the Booker case to argue their
position that closing Longfellow was counterproductive. 248 In a
hearing on the motion to intervene, Longfellow parents advised the
court that Longfellow was "naturally integrated" with a minority
student population of approximately 17% of the total student
enrollment.24 9
Shortly after the hearing, with the first day of school less than
three weeks away, the court issued an order denying the parents'
motion to intervene. 250 The court based its decision on the impor-
tance of avoiding further uncertainty "for parents, students, teach-
ers and school administrators at a time when plans for the start of
the school year must go forward."251 The court also admitted its
reluctance to "jeopardize in any way" the district's efforts to achieve
compliance with the court's revised 46%/39% student enrollment
guidelines.25 2
Although the first day of the 1978-79 school year and a new
round of racial desegregation went smoothly, parents of Longfellow
students continued to express frustration that the school board had
acted so quickly to close the school. Several of the parents decided
to send their children to parochial school.2s3 As one parent com-
plained, "They did it so fast ... They didn't give us any alternative
and we didn't have a chance to fight it. They don't even listen to
you. They decided and that's it."254
246. Duty & McGrath, supra note 235, at 1A, 4A.
247. Gregor W. Pinney, Parents' School Appeal Denied, MumN-PoLus TRi., Aug.
11, 1978, at lB.
248. Booker, No. 4-71 Civ. 382 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 1978).
249. Pinney, supra note 247, at lB.
250. Booker, No. 4-71-Civ. 382, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 1978).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Gregor W. Pinney, Several in Desegregation Plan Enroll in Parochial
Schools, Mu-NEAPOms Tam., Aug. 29, 1978, at 1A.
254. Debra Stone, Students Are Adapting, But Many Miss Longfellow, Mn-NEmo-
Ls STAR, Sept. 6, 1978, at 7B.
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V. The Eighth Circuit Approves Continued Jurisdiction
As the district's plan for implementing the court's 46%/39%
desegregation guidelines went forward, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the district's appeal of the court's order retain-
ing jurisdiction over the litigation. 255 At oral argument in Septem-
ber, 1978, attorney Duane Khronke argued on behalf of the school
district that the district court's jurisdiction over school desegrega-
tion should be terminated. Eighth Circuit Judge Ross expressed
concern about the ramifications of the school district's position: "I
suppose every school district in the country,... could say '[w]e've
done what you asked;' and then would go back to what it was
before." 256 Judge Ross also took issue with the district's contention
that it had sufficiently desegregated the Minneapolis schools:
"Judge Larson says you never have [complied] with his opinion."257
When counsel for the school district advised the court that the dis-
trict had complied with the court's faculty desegregation orders and
had discontinued the optional attendance zones and discretionary
transfers which had contributed to segregation in the past, Judge
Henley observed, "It]hat says you've done everything but
integrate."258
A month after the oral argument, the Eighth Circuit panel
unanimously affirmed Judge Larson's May, 1978 ruling.259 Judge
Henley, writing for the court, stated simply:
The instant case was filed in August, 1971, and Judge Larson
has worked with it for more than seven years. As the Adden-
dum to the Board's brief establishes, the trial judge has filed a
total of at least fourteen opinions and orders in the case...
Prior to 1978 the Board did not see fit to appeal from any of the
orders of the district court ....
Judge Larson has a familiarity with this case and the
problems it presents that this court cannot easily obtain. We
see nothing clearly erroneous in his factual findings; we see no
misconceptions of law in his 1978 opinion; and we see no abuse
of discretion in the results that he reached.260
At a school board meeting shortly after the Eighth Circuit's
ruling, Superintendent Arveson reported that preliminary informa-
tion from the district's annual sight count indicated that all the
city's schools would comply with the 46%/39% student enrollment
255. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 585 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1978).
256. Gregor W. Pinney, New Judges Hear City Desegregation Case, MiNNEAmous
TRIs., Sept. 16, 1978, at 1A, 4A-
257. Id.
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. Booker, 585 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
260. Id. at 354-55.
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guidelines for the 1978-79 school year.2 6 1 Despite the projected
compliance, the school board members who voted in favor of the ini-
tial Eighth Circuit appeal, now voted to petition the United States
Supreme Court for review. 2 62 Board member Olson explained the
appeal as "a matter of principle."2 63 Olson added, "[ilt's so we can
run our schools instead of having Judge Larson run our schools."
26 4
The district's semi-annual report to the court in December,
1978 confirmed Superintendent Arveson's earlier prediction that all
schools would comply with the court's order for the first time since
the court case began.265 The compliance resulted from additional
busing and from the use of a technique called "controlled enroll-
ment."26 6 Under controlled enrollment, principals at some schools
simply refused to admit minority students after the beginning of
the fall term if the minority percentage was too high.267 A total of
157 minority students from five schools in the north and east areas
of the city were turned away from their "first choice" school and
were assigned to other schools by the time the district filed its semi-
annual report in December.2 68
As the district continued its efforts to meet the court's guide-
lines for the fall of 1979, the United States Supreme Court issued
an order refusing to review the district's contention that it should
be released from the court's jurisdiction. 269 School board member
Harry Davis, one of the three board members who had opposed the
appeal, reacted to the high court's decision: "I feel very excited and
very happy about it .... To appeal the decision of a judge that had
bent over backwards to let us determine our own destiny was an
261. Nancy Paulu, City Schools Will Further Appeal Race-Mixing Bind, MnN-EAp-
oLIs STAR, Oct. 25, 1978, at 8B.
262. Id.
263. Gregor W. Pinney, Arveson: Schools Meet Court Orders, MuQEaLPous TuB.,
Oct. 26, 1978, at A, 7A.
264. Id.
265. Gregor W. Pinney, Minority Enrollments in City Schools Reach Court Or-
dered Levels, MxNNAPoLs Thm., Dec. 9, 1978, at 13A.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.; Gregor W. Pinney, 5 Schools To Stop Enrolling Minorities, MucLsmoms
TRmB., Sept. 2, 1978, at 1A. North High School's full-time minority enrollment con-
tinued to exceed the court's revised 46%/39% guidelines. North did achieve compli-
ance through enrollment control in the part-time desegregation program, which the
court had approved for North and the predominately white schools of Henry and
Edison in northeast Minneapolis (the HEN program). By requiring late enrolling
students at North, Henry and Edison to take at least two of their classes each day at
one of the other buildings, North's minority enrollment was reduced to below the
guideline percentages at every hour of the day. Id.
269. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
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exercise in futility, I think. I would rather have spent that money
on providing better education and retaining minority staff."270
A. Claims Against Housing Officials Dismissed
A month after the Supreme Court's decision, Judge Larson is-
sued an order ending the school district's efforts to implicate federal
and city housing officials.271 According to the district, the Minne-
apolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority (MHRA) and the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) had frustrated the district's efforts to comply with court-or-
dered desegregation by building low income housing on the near
north side of Minneapolis, which increased the concentration of mi-
nority residents in that area of the city.2 72
Housing officials raised numerous arguments in support of
their motion to dismiss the district's third-party complaint.273 The
court found most persuasive those arguments directed to pruden-
tial, equitable and practical considerations. Judge Larson wrote,
"[i]n the words of the Supreme Court, '[o]ne vehicle can carry only a
limited amount of baggage.'"274 The court's order explained:
Previous Orders in this case state that the District not only
knew of the racial segregation in Minneapolis, it exploited that
segregation to keep the schools from being integrated. The
whole case revolves around what the District did with the
knowledge it had. It does not revolve around what kind of dem-
ographic pattern the municipal and Federal housing authori-
ties "provided" the District with. On the contrary, the central,
litigated issue (to which MHRA and HUD were not parties) was
how the District conducted itself given the full knowledge it had
of the city's population distribution. 275
Noting that five years had passed since the district answered the
original complaint, Judge Larson refused to consider the "new is-
sues, new parties and new theories of liability" which the district's
claims against the housing officials would entail.276 The court dis-
missed the district's third party complaint with prejudice. 277
270. Court Refuses Minneapolis Busing Case, M'NEAM'OLIs Thm., July 3, 1979, at
1A, 6A.
271. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382 (D. Minn. Aug. 8,
1979).
272. Id. at 1.
273. Id. at 2.
274. Id. at 3 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1, 22 (1971)).
275. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 4.
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B. Compliance Through Controlled Enrollment: 1978-1980
When school began in the fall of 1979, the district's schools
were again in compliance with the court-ordered guidelines for stu-
dent enrollment.278 As in the previous year, the district employed
controlled enrollment to limit the number of minority students
when a school was at or near the court-ordered 49%/36% maximum
minority enrollment.2 79 Claiming it had now fully complied with
the court's May, 1978 order, the school district again renewed its
motion to terminate the litigation. 280 Plaintiffs opposed the dis-
trict's motion and filed a separate motion attacking the district's
controlled enrollment technique as discriminatory. 28 '
At the hearing before the court in April, 1980, plaintiffs ar-
gued that, over the previous two years, controlled enrollment had
diverted more than 400 minority students for desegregation pur-
poses 282 compared to only 10 white students involved in the HEN
program.283 Judge Larson agreed that the controlled enrollment
plan as implemented raised serious concerns - serious enough that
he was unwilling to terminate the court's jurisdiction until the dis-
trict could demonstrate that the burdens of its desegregation plan,
including controlled enrollment, did not fall inequitably on minority
students.284 Plaintiffs also objected to the district's failure to de-
velop an adequate plan to hire and retain minority teachers.
Although the proportion of minority teachers had not declined as
feared, and in fact had remained constant at approximately 10%
278. Gregor W. Pinney, Judge to Hear Desegregation Debate, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB.,
Apr. 15, 1980, at 1A. See Court Refuses Minneapolis Busing Case, MINNEAPOLIS
Tm., July 8, 1979, at 1A.
279. Pinney, supra note 278, at 1K
280. Id. at A, 6A (the school board asked Judge Larson to end court oversight
based on the district's compliance in 1978 and 1979).
281. Id. at 1A, 6A (plaintiffs contended the discriminatory impact of the plan vio-
lated Judge Larson's original order barring discrimination).
282. Id. at 1A.
283. Id.
284. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 3 (D.
Minn. May 1, 1980). The court suggested that while the controlled enrollment plan
as implemented almost exclusively affected minorities,
It does not appear that this is necessary. Rather than only turning
away minority students from schools which are close to violating the
Court's guidelines, the defendants could also turn away white students
at schools with very high majority race percentages and send those stu-
dents to the schools with racial percentages close to the maximum per-
missible levels. This would achieve the same result while distributing




since 1978,285 the court directed that "[ilf, in fact, a large number of
minority teachers must be laid off this fall, defendants should file a
written motion immediately and request a hearing before the Court
to seek an order to allow defendants to lay off on other than a strict
seniority basis."286
Two months later, in July, 1980, the district's first black
school superintendent, Richard Green, assumed control of the dis-
trict's operations. Green proposed pairing predominantly white
and predominantly minority schools for "two-way controlled enroll-
ment," so that "when minority students must be sent to another
school, that school ... [would] send its late white enrollees to the
school with a higher minority enrollment.28 7 Green also offered to
provide a long range plan for more permanent district-wide integra-
tion.288 In the fall of 1980, two-way controlled enrollment suc-
ceeded in increasing the number of white students diverted to other
schools.289 However, the number of white students who actually
participated in the two-way program was less than expected be-
cause many senior high white students simply refused to report to
their assigned school.29o
In January 1981, plaintiffs asked the court to retain the case
until the issues of controlled enrollment and minority teacher re-
tention were fully resolved.291 Plaintiffs also requested the oppor-
tunity to review the district's long range integration plan, which the
district pledged to complete by May, 1981.292 On January 27, 1981,
the court agreed to retain jurisdiction until after the district had
submitted its long range plan, with the caveat that, "[a]s previously
noted, the case has been pending for about nine years and like all
285. Pinney, supra note 278, at 6A (it was expected that since the layoff lists con-
tained a disproportionate number of minority teachers, the district would not be able
to retain minority teachers).
286. Id. at 2.
287. Kate Stanley, There's Still a Long Way to Go to Real Integration in the
Schools, MwNF wssOLS STAR, July 25, 1980, at 4A ("Because more minority students
than white students ... [were] late enrollees.... [it was] estimated [that] 69 percent
of students bused ... [would be] minority group members, even though those stu-
dents made up only 28 percent of public school enrollment [during the 1979-80
school year].").
288. Id. at 4A (Superintendent Greene's plan involved a "10-year long-range pro-
jection of enrollments, buildings, and programs").
289. Gregor W. Pinney, School-Switching Plan Involves More Whites, MwNxmsso-
Us TRiB., Dec. 5, 1980, at lB.
290. Id. at 1B, 7B. Of the 156 white high school students who were diverted
under the controlled enrollment procedures, 81% did not report to their assigned
school. Some of these students went to a technical school or other specialized pro-
gram. Others dropped out of school, left the district, or went to private schools. Id.
291. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 1 (D.
Minn. Jan. 27, 1981).
292. Id. at 1-2.
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cases it must sometime end."2 93 On June 17, 1981, the court ap-
proved a joint proposal by plaintiffs and the school district to elimi-
nate controlled enrollment and to raise the enrollment guideline to
a maximum of 50% minority student enrollment. 29 4
Judge Larson also agreed to retain jurisdiction for one more
year to allow the completion of the district's long range plan.295
The plan would incorporate pending school board decisions concern-
ing which buildings to keep open and which to close. The parties
agreed to design the long range plan to insure that each school's
minority enrollment would not exceed the district-wide average mi-
nority enrollment by more than 15%.296 In addition, the parties
agreed that the student population of every school in the district
would be involved in the district's desegregation/integration
effort.297
VI. Ten Years of Desegregation
In August, 1981, ten years after the initial Hale-Field pairing
began the desegregation process in Minneapolis, Minneapolis Trib-
une writer Greg Pinney reviewed the progress and the changes in
Minneapolis public schools since August, 1971: "No longer does the
city have 'minority schools' in the center and 'white schools' every-
where else. Minority and white students have been spread around
to such an extent that it is difficult to put those labels on any school
anymore."298 There were other major changes in the district as
well. Total enrollment of whites declined from 58,000 students in
1971 to 29,000 students in 1981, a decline of 50%; and minority en-
rollment increased from 8,700 in 1971 to 13,000 in 1981, an in-
crease of 70%.299 Some observers claimed desegregation was
responsible for the overall declining enrollment, especially among
white students.3Oo According to Pinney, however, enrollment began
dropping prior to desegregation due to declining birth rates.30
293. Id.
294. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 2 (D.
Minn. June 17, 1981).
295. Id. at 3.
296. Id. at 2.
297. Id.
298. Gregor W. Pinney, Desegregation Strips Race Labels Off Schools, MmNEpo-
Ls Twu., Aug. 31, 1981, at 1A.
299. Id. at 4A ("When the case began, 87 percent [of the students] were white and
just 13 percent were black or Indian or Hispanic or Asian. When it ended, the white
proportion had shrunk to 69 percent, and the minority part had risen to 31
percent.").
300. Id.




Desegregation undoubtedly caused some students to leave the
Minneapolis public schools, although no hard data exists on how
many actually left for this reason. The percentage of students en-
rolled in private schools fell in the early 1970s when desegregation
began, but rose during the late 1970s to reach 18.6% in 1980.302
Reports do suggest that parents reacted to specific desegregation
decisions by withdrawing their children from the public schools.
For example, when pairing first began there, an unusually large
number of students in the Hale-Field area transferred to private
schools or left the district.30 3 Seven years later, 64 students left the
public school system when the district closed Longfellow. 304
Proponents of desegregation nonetheless viewed the results of
the process favorably.30 5 Even avowed opponents of busing con-
ceded that desegregation helped create a climate in which Superin-
tendent Green, the first black superintendent in Minneapolis, could
be appointed. Busing opponent and school board chair Philip Olson
commented, "I feel better about [Green's appointment] than any-
thing we've done in busing."30 6
Superintendent Green pronounced desegregation a success in
reducing racial isolation in the school district.307 Green shared his
views about the benefits of desegregation when, as principal of
North High School, he appeared before the advisory committee to
the United States Civil Rights Commission:
The basic benefit is coming to know someone who exists outside
your frame of reference . . . the breakdown [of] the fear and
stereotypes and myths that people have about other people, and
that goes across racial lines.... One of the other pluses is to do
away with the distinction that is perpetuated by some research-
ers that whites suffer academically when they move into a de-
segregated setting.., or the other myth is that blacks learn
more when they sit in a classroom with whites.
We find that achievement is based on individual capabil-
ity and competence and continues to be based on individual ca-
pability and competence.3 0 8
302. Pinney, supra note 298, at 1A ("Across the state, the percentage of students'
in private schools fell from 19.7 to 9.3 percent and then gained.., after 1975").
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Gregor W. Pinney, 11th Year of City School Desegregation Begins, MnEATpo-
us TRIB., Aug. 30, 1981, at 1A, 5A.
306. Id. at 1A.
307. Id. at 5A ("Racial isolation has been diminished in the school district. I feel
it has made a contribution in the community toward bringing that about... I think
desegregation made it much easier for new immigrants (the Indochinese) to settle in
this community. I think it broke the way for that to occur").
308. Advisory Comm. Tr., supra note 9, at 507-08. Attorney Quaintance offered
his own views to the advisory committee on the issue of student achievement:
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A. The District's Long Range Plan: 1982
As promised, in the spring of 1982, the district submitted a
long range plan to the court coupled with a desegregation/integra-
tion plan for the years 1982 through 1986. The long range plan
contemplated 17 school closings in response to financial considera-
tions and the district's declining enrollment. 30 9 The plan required
major dislocations of students and teachers at the outset, but then
allowed a period of stability of at least five years.3 1 0
Plaintiffs challenged the plan as placing an unequal burden on
minority students. Plaintiffs requested the court eliminate a
programmatic exchange program for North and Edison High
Schools, keep open two other successfully desegregated schools, and
relocate some of the primary centers to communities with substan-
tial numbers of minority residents.3 11 After reviewing each of the
plaintiffs' concerns, the court approved the plan proposed by the
district, stating "it is important to view the deficiencies shown by
plaintiffs in the context of a plan that will represent a major step
toward desegregation/integration throughout the city as a
whole."3 12 In view of these deficiencies, however, the court decided
to retain jurisdiction for "at least one more year so that the Court
will be able to monitor the implementation of the desegregation/in-
tegration plan."3 13
B. The Court Ends Its Jurisdiction
One year later, on June 8, 1983, Judge Larson dissolved his
order governing the desegregation of the Minneapolis public
Mou don't integrate because the kids get higher test scores; you inte-
grate because otherwise people are scarred. The children are scarred
and know [that] they aren't deemed as worthy or as worthwhile as the
kids in the white schools,
Id. at 443. Quaintance advised the committee that:
in the context of Minneapolis .... when a school becomes racially identi-
fied as a black school or as an Indian school .... what happens is that
that school is shunted off to the side. It doesn't get the same kind of
support, and... the kids who go to the racially identified schools get
the message that they aren't worth as much as the other kids.
Id. at 441-42.
309. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 2 (D.
Minn. June 22, 1982); see Desegregation/Integration Plan: 1982-83 through 1986-
87, Minneapolis Public Schools, 1-3, Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71
Civ. 382 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 1982).
310. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 3-4 (D.
Minn. June 22, 1982).
311. Id. at 14.
312. Id. at 14.
313. Id. at 15.
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schools.314 He noted that seven or eight years ago some members of
the school board completely opposed integration/desegregation and
any remedy the court might impose. Now, Judge Larson said, he
was "convinced that the majority, if not all, of the School Board and
the Superintendent and his staff will support the constitutional
rights of the students and will respect the rights of all of our citi-
zens, including students, to the equal protection of the law as re-
quired by the Constitution."315 The order concluded:
The Court believes and finds that the District should have the
opportunity for autonomous compliance with constitutional
standards, that the State Department of Education should and
will monitor implementation of the long range plan which in-
cludes integration/desegregation and that the North-Edison ex-
change program satisfies constitutional standards.
The complaint in this case was filed in 1971 and a
number of trials, hearings and other proceedings have contin-
ued since 1972. The Court appreciates the dedication of plain-
tiffs and their counsel to the integration/desegregation process
and to the maintenance and preservation of constitutional
rights.316
After it was clear neither party would appeal the court's rul-
ing, Judge Larson agreed to discuss the case publicly with reporter
Greg Pinney.317 Larson shared some personal information, includ-
ing the fact that he and his children graduated from the Minneapo-
lis public schools.31s He also discussed the criticism he received
from friends and neighbors and in letters written to him during the
litigation. Despite the controversy, Judge Larson said he enjoyed
the opportunity to work on school desegregation issues and had no
hesitation about his decision in 1972, ordering the district to
desegregate. 319
The judge did confess to some misgivings about relinquishing
jurisdiction over the desegregation process: "I think the pressure I
could exercise as a judge in enforcing the orders could make it more
likely there will be compliance."320 "But," he added, "I think
enough progress has been made. And, I'm impressed with the in-
314. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 6 (D.
Minn. June 8, 1983).
315. Id. at 5.
316. Id.
317. Gregor W. Pinney, Constitutional Rights Came Before 'White-Flight' Con-
cerns for Judge, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), July 8, 1983, at 1A, 5A-
318. Id. at 5A ("It had never occurred to him [at that time] that the system had
been practicing segregation").
319. Id. ("I decided this was both a legal wrong - that was true, it was a constitu-





terest of the board and the superintendent and staff and teachers to
continue to make it work.... [Overall] the final results, although
not entirely perfect,... [do] represent a reasonable desegregation-
integration program."321
VII. Desegregation Today
A decade has passed since the court relinquished its jurisdic-
tion over the district's desegregation efforts. Both the racial compo-
sition of the student body and the district's approach to educating
its students have changed to some degree. Student enrollment in
the suburban school districts surrounding Minneapolis remains
largely white. In Minneapolis, however, students of color now make
up over half of the public school enrollment.322
The district continues to rely on the concepts of teaching alter-
natives and parental choice to maintain desegregated schools. The
city is divided into three large busing zones, and parents may de-
cide among schools within each zone.3 23 Alternatives also include
district-wide magnet schools that offer specialized programs on Na-
tive American language and culture, French, international culture
and the fine arts, math and science, Spanish or the urban
environment.3 24
Two of the district's magnet programs operate outside State
Board of Education desegregation rules. In 1991, the district ob-
tained a variance to operate its American Indian and French pro-
gram with over 80% minority-race students.325 The State
Commissioner of Education also agreed that the district could oper-
ate an experimental all-black academy on the city's north side.326
Both the Afrocentric Educational Academy and the Native Ameri-
can magnet program feature cultural enrichment along with other
subjects. The Native American program aims to reflect Indian cul-
tural values and includes the study of French, Dakota and Ojibwe
languages. The school's theme is a circle, a symbol of unity and
completeness for many Indians.327
321. Id.
322. Rob Hotakainen, Community Schools Movement Prompts a Clash of Values,
STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Feb. 24, 1992, at IA.
323. Kevin Duchschere, Multiple Choice: Twin Cities Parents Have Many Options
on Schools, STAR Tais. (Minneapolis), Jan. 25, 1992, at 1B, 2B.
324. Id. at 2B.
325. Rob Hotakainen, Panel Waives Desegregation For School, STAR TRIB. (Minne-
apolis), Aug. 13, 1991, at lB.
326. Rob Hotakainen, All-Black Academy OK For Now, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis),
Aug. 22, 1991, at lB.
327. Rob Hotakainen, Whites in Demand at School for Indians, STAR TRiB. (Min-
neapolis), Aug. 12, 1991, at IA, 6A.
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The theme of the Afrocentric Educational Academy is
"Dreamkeepers," and posters in the school pay tribute to them:
Harriet Tubman, Malcolm X, Booker T. Washington, Thurgood
Marshall, Louis Armstrong.328 The district began the academy in
January, 1991, at the urging of black parents. Although the acad-
emy is open to all students, it is aimed at finding new ways to help
black students succeed in Minneapolis schools. In 1991, all of its
students and teachers were black.329 The Minneapolis Urban
League has opposed the all-black academy as "a step to resegregat-
ing the schools."330 The NAACP has also voiced concerns regarding
the academy: "As a temporary thing, it is fine. As a permanent sep-
arate school, we would be totally opposed.... The fact of the matter
is that it is born out of desperation. Something has to be done."331
School officials have supported the programs as a means of reach-
ing students of color who may have difficulty succeeding in other
programs. At least one school board member has acknowledged
that continuation of these programs raises "some of the most inter-
esting, important, profound and difficult issues facing public educa-
tion in the '90s."332
Other city residents have simply advocated more neighbor-
hood schools. Proponents of neighborhood schools say creating the
schools would slow middle-class flight to the suburbs, save money
in tight transportation budgets, and make it easier for parents to
become involved in the schools.33 3 According to one school board
member, "[ilt's people from the neighborhoods - including a lot of
minorities - asking for neighborhood schools" as part of the neigh-
borhood revitalization planning process sponsored by the city of
Minneapolis.33 4 Opponents of the return to neighborhood schools
say the risks are too great: "The risks are that you'll immediately
see extremely unequal schools. It's a big step toward a place where
we've already been: back to the future."335
The district has begun to develop new plans to guide its opera-
tions over the coming years. Included in the discussions are con-
328. Rob Hotakainen, I am Special: The Afrocentric Education Academy, Minne-
apolis'Experiment in Education, Teaches More Than The Three R's, STAR TRIB. (Min-
neapolis), June 9, 1991, at A, 12A_
329. Id.
330. Id. at 12A (quoting Charles Nichols, Chairman of the Board of the Minneapo-
lis Urban League) "[T]he league's board voted 24-0 to oppose the academy, reason-
ing that it's wrong to use public money to isolate black students." Id.
331. Rob Hotakainen, A Clash of Ideals Puts All-Black School to Test, STAR Tam.
(Minneapolis), July 19, 1991, at A, 15A.
332. Id.
333. Hotakainen, supra note 322, at IA.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 9A.
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cepts of neighborhood schools, school choice and school
transportation priorities.336 Meanwhile, the State Board of Educa-
tion has given preliminary approval to replace the requirement that
no school operate with a minority enrollment which exceeds 15% of
the school district's average minority enrollment.337 The Board
proposal replaces the 15% standard with a more general require-
ment "that students be integrated in a way that improves achieve-
ment."338 The Board has also proposed a desegregation plan which
includes all seven counties in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
3 3 9
The plan is voluntary, and success may depend, in part, on the re-
sponse of the Legislature. 340 At least one news reporter believes
that a lack of money, hardened attitudes and inconvenience for
families stand in its way.34 1 Yet others believe that while metro-
politan desegregation plans are "bound to arouse opposition," even-
tually a metropolitan-wide approach is "going to have to
happen,"342 because "[d]iversity is crucial to our society and our
children [and] [i]f we don't embrace this plan in a voluntary way, in
two or three years [the courts] will do the job for us."343
Issues of desegregation and integration will continue to play a
prominent role in educational policy in the coming decades. In fac-
ing the challenges that lie ahead, school officials, parents and
teachers would do well to remember an admonition from one of the
many orders Judge Larson issued in Booker: "I should remind the
School Board and School officials that whether or not this Court
retains jurisdiction, they still have an obligation to respect the Con-
stitution of the United States, which requires equal protection of
the law for all of our citizens regardless of race."3 4 4
336. E.g., Hotakainen, supra note 322, at Al (discussing neighborhood school and
transportation priorities); Duchschere, supra note 323, at B1, B2.
337. Nancy Livingston, State Plan Would Halt School Desegregation, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PREss, Nov. 10, 1992, at 1A, 8A.
338. Id. at 8A.
339. Laurie Blake, Desegregation Plan Would Include Suburbs, STAR Tam. (Min-
neapolis), Jan. 11, 1994 at 1A, 6A.
340. Laurie Blake, Metro Desegregation: An Uphill Battle, STAR Tam., Jan. 16,
1994 at 1A, 10A-11A.
341. Id. at 1KA
342. Id.
343. Id. (quoting Superintendent Linda Powell).
344. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 2 (D.
Minn. Aug. 8, 1977).
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